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SUMMARY 
THESE ARE THE GOOD OLD DAYS: 
FOREIGN ENTRY AND THE MEXICAN BANKING SYSTEM 
 
In 1997, the Mexican government reversed long-standing policies and allowed foreign 
banks to purchase Mexico’s largest commercial banks and relaxed restrictions on the 
founding of new, foreign-owned banks.  The result has been a dramatic shift in the ownership 
structure of Mexico’s banks. For instance, while in 1991 only one percent of bank assets in 
Mexico were foreign owned, today they control 74 percent of assets. In no other country in 
the world has the penetration of foreign banks been as rapid or as far-reaching as in Mexico. 
In this work we examine some of the important implications of foreign bank entry for social 
welfare in Mexico.  Did liberalization lead to an increase (or decrease) in the supply of credit?  
Did liberalization lead to an increase (or decrease) in the cost of credit?  Did liberalization 
lead to an increase (or decrease) in the stability of the banking system? 
In order to answer these questions, we must first ask, ―increase (or decrease), 
measured on what basis?‖  There are, in fact, two distinct conceptual frameworks through 
which one can assess the impact of foreign bank entry.  One is concerned with measuring the 
short-run impacts of foreign entry on credit abundance, pricing, and observable stability using 
reduced form regressions.  The other is an institutional economics conception of how to 
measure performance. It is focused on understanding whether foreign entry gave rise to 
difficult-to-reverse changes in the political economy of bank regulation, which will affect 
competition and stability in the long term, outside the period that may be observed 
empirically.  We employ both conceptions in this paper.    3 
When we look at the impact of foreign entry using econometrics, the evidence 
strongly indicates that Mexico’s banking system is now much more stable. The ratio of non-
performing loans has declined dramatically, while equity ratios have increased.   System 
stability does not appear to have come at the cost of a decrease in the availability of credit.  In 
fact, credit to firms and households has increased in real terms.  System stability also does not 
appear to have come at the cost of higher priced credit. In fact, the evidence suggests that 
foreign banks charge lower interest spreads than domestically-owned banks.  
When we take a broader, political economy view of the impact of foreign bank entry 
in Mexico, the evidence indicates that there if there ever was a ―good old days‖ of Mexican 
banking, in which credit was abundant and the system was stable, we are in it.  From the 
1920s through the 1960s the Mexican banking system was stable, but it provided very modest 
amounts of credit to firms and households.  Moreover, the stability of the system may have 
been an artifact of the ability of commercial banks to shift risk to government-owned 
development banks, which is to say that risk was quietly shifted to taxpayers.  The banking 
system that existed in Mexico from the 1970s until 1997 was characterized by periods of rapid 
credit growth, followed by devastating busts, the aftermaths of which were characterized by 
very low levels of credit provision.  Indeed, the Mexican banking system during this period 
was, by the standards of the rest of the world, extraordinarily unstable. 
In order to understand the reasons why the Mexican government changed its long-
standing policies against foreign ownership in the late 1990s, we examine the terms of play 
between banks and the state in Mexico using the so-called ―game of bank bargains‖ of 
Calomiris and Haber (forthcoming), which sees the banking system as a partnership between   4 
financiers, the parties in control of the government, and the groups that the government views 
as essential to maintaining its hold on power.  
We use this framework to explain why and how the bank privatization of 1991-92 had 
built-in incentives for moral hazard.  That is, the government was able to craft a partnership, 
but the terms of that partnership meant that the bankers had very little to lose if something 
went wrong. This perverse alignment of incentives produced reckless lending from 1992 to 
1995, which resulted in a banking crisis (1995-96), an expensive bailout, and the rejection of 
the PRI by voters in 1997 and 2000.  
When the government of Ernesto Zedillo thought about how to craft a stable 
partnership after rescuing the banks in 1995-96, it was therefore very cautious when it came 
to choosing its partners, lest it be politically exposed again.  Rather than choosing to partner 
with domestic financiers, the Zedillo government chose a set of large, foreign-owned banks. 
From the point of view of the Zedillo government, foreign partners had four advantages: 1) 
they could be counted on recapitalize the banks with real (not fictitious) capital; 2) they did 
not own downstream non-financial enterprises that they be induced to save during a crisis by 
tunneling into their own banks; 3) they could not reasonably expect to be bailed out by the 
government in the event of a crisis; and 4) their managements might be concerned about not 
running afoul of regulators and stockholders in their home countries.  In short, foreign 
bankers had a lot to lose if they mismanaged their end of the partnership. In our econometric 
results we show that the behavior of foreign banks, both those that acquired Mexican banks 
and the de novo operations, is consistent with our political economy analysis that the bank 
partnership is today more stable as a consequence of foreign bank entry.   5 
Introduction 
For the past 15 years Mexico has been engaged in an ambitious experiment.  Mexico’s 
banking system had been closed to foreign competition throughout most of the 20
th century.
1  
In 1997, however, the Mexican government reversed long-standing policies and allowed 
foreign banks to purchase Mexico’s largest commercial banks.  It also relaxed restrictions on 
the founding of new, foreign-owned banks in Mexico.  The result has been a dramatic shift in 
the ownership structure of Mexico’s banking industry.  In 1991, only one percent of bank 
assets in Mexico were foreign owned.  By 1996, on the eve of the reforms, the proportion was 
still only 7 percent.   After the bank ownership rules were changed, the proportion of bank 
assets under foreign ownership jumped to 20 percent in 1998, to 57 percent by 2000, and to 
82 percent by 2002.  As of the end of 2011, it was 74 percent. (See Table 1 and Figure 1).  
Other countries, including the United States, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Brazil, Turkey, the 
Philippines, and much of Western Europe, also opened up their banking sectors to foreign 
competition at roughly the same time.  In no other case, however, has the penetration of 
foreign banks been as rapid or as far reaching as in Mexico. 
The decision to allow foreign banks to enter the Mexican market has important 
implications for social welfare.  Did liberalization lead to an increase (or decrease) in the 
supply of credit?  Did liberalization lead to an increase (or decrease) in the cost of credit?  Did 
liberalization lead to an increase (or decrease) in the stability of the banking system? 
                                                 
1 As a practical matter, Mexico’s banks had been majority owned by domestic 
interests since the 1930s.  This situation was codified in 1966 by President Gustavo Díaz 
Ordaz, who ordered that the banking industry had to be domestically owned.  This was part of 
a more general initiative under Díaz Ordaz to force foreign investors across a broad range of 
enterprises to sell majority stakes to Mexican owners. (Izquierdo 1995: 112, 119).   6 
In order to answer these questions, we must first ask, ―increase (or decrease), 
measured on what basis?‖  There are, in fact, two distinct conceptual frameworks through 
which one can assess the impact of foreign bank entry.  One of these is based on the financial 
economics conception of banking system performance. It is concerned with measuring the 
short-run impacts of foreign entry on credit abundance, pricing, and observable stability using 
reduced form regressions.  The other is an institutional economics conception of how to 
measure performance. It is focused on understanding whether foreign entry gave rise to 
difficult-to-reverse changes in the political economy of bank regulation, which will affect 
competition and stability in the long term, outside the period that may be observed 
empirically.  We employ both conceptions in this paper. We employ reduced form regressions 
in order to estimate the effects of foreign entry on the pricing and availability of credit, as 
well as the effects of foreign entry on the stability of the banking system.  We also, however, 
assess changes in the institutions that underlie the Mexican banking system, comparing the 
incentives generated under a system of foreign owned banks against those that existed in 
Mexico since the 1920s.  In short, in order to answer the question ―did the liberalization of 
foreign entry enhance welfare,‖ we draw on analytic tools from financial economics, 
economic history, and political science. 
When we look at the impact of foreign entry using the tools financial economics, the 
evidence strongly indicates that Mexico’s banking system is now much more stable. The ratio 
of non-performing loans has declined dramatically, while equity ratios have increased.   
System stability does not appear to have come at the cost of a decrease in the availability of 
credit.  In fact, credit to firms and households has increased in real terms.  System stability   7 
also does not appear to have come at the cost of higher priced credit. In fact, the evidence 
suggests that foreign banks charge lower interest spreads than domestically-owned banks.  
When we take a broader, political economy view of the impact of foreign bank entry 
in Mexico, the evidence indicates that there if there ever was a ―good old days‖ of Mexican 
banking, in which credit was abundant and the system was stable, we are in it.  From the 
1920s through the 1960s the Mexican banking system was stable, but it provided very modest 
amounts of credit to firms and households.  Moreover, the stability of the system may have 
been an artifact of the ability of commercial banks to shift risk to government-owned 
development banks, which is to say that risk was quietly shifted to taxpayers.  The banking 
system that existed in Mexico from the 1970s until 1997 was characterized by periods of rapid 
credit growth, followed by devastating busts, the aftermaths of which were characterized by 
very low levels of credit provision.  Indeed, the Mexican banking system during this period 
was, by the standards of the rest of the world, extraordinarily unstable. 
Thinking about the consequences of foreign bank entry in Mexico in a long-term 
context is not just about specifying the right comparison; it is about understanding the reasons 
why the Mexican government changed its long-standing policies against foreign ownership in 
the late 1990s, and is about understanding why that change in policy has fundamentally 
altered the terms of play between banks and the state in Mexico.  As we shall show in the 
pages that follow, the events leading up to the liberalization of the banking laws in 1997, 
including the bank expropriation of 1982, the privatization of 1991-92, and the rescue of the 
banking system in 1995-96, were all part of a much larger game that was being played 
between a government with few limits on its authority and discretion and a group of bankers, 
who could only operate within the confines of a legal and regulatory environment that was   8 
under the control of the government.  The liberalization of foreign entry changed that game: it 
is much harder for the government to behave opportunistically toward the banks, but it is also 
much harder for the banks to pass along losses to taxpayers.   
We proceed as follows.  In Section Two we discuss the relevant academic literatures. 
In Section Three we draw on the extant literature to provide a logical framework that can 
order the facts related to the events that led up to the decision to liberalize Mexico’s banking 
system in 1997, as well as to order the facts related to the behavior of Mexico’s banks after 
liberalization in 1997.  In Section Four we examine the economic and political history of 
Mexico’s banking system in the 20
th century, focusing in particular on the impact of the 
expropriation of the banks in 1982, the privatization of those expropriated banks in 1991-92, 
and the government’s need to bail out (and in some cases re-nationalize) those same banks in 
1995-96 because of flaws that were built into the design of the privatization program.  In 
Section Five we employ the facts from Section Four to develop an econometric strategy with 
which to measure the welfare effects of foreign entry.  We also introduce the unique dataset 
we have constructed. Section Six leads the reader through the analysis of the data.  Section 
Seven then embeds the econometric results into the logical framework we introduce in 
Section Three. It also presents our conclusions.   9 
Section Two 
Literature Review 
There are three bodies of scholarship that are relevant to our study of the effects of 
foreign bank entry in Mexico. The first of these is the financial economics literature on 
foreign entry in middle income countries.  The second of these is the political economy 
literature on banking systems as an implicit partnership between governments and financiers.  
The third is the literature on the economic and political history of banking in Mexico.   
 
The Financial Economics Literature on Foreign Entry 
Mexico is not the only country that has opened its banking system to foreign entry.  As 
a result, there is a sizable financial economics literature that attempts to estimate the short-run 
impact of foreign entry. This literature employs reduced form regressions designed to detect 
robust associations between foreign market shares or foreign ownership with administrative 
costs or net interest margins.  The nature of the enterprise is necessarily short-run in nature: 
over the long-run, the equilibrium outcome will be that inefficient banks will disappear from 
the system, so that all banks, regardless of ownership will price credit identically.  
Most of the studies that have emerged from this research conclude that foreign entry 
increases the contestability of markets, thereby reducing administrative costs, lowering net 
interest margins (NIMs), and driving down bank rates of return. Nevertheless, as Clarke, Cull, 
Martínez Peria, and Sánchez (2004) note, much of what we know comes from cross-country 
studies that are heavily weighted toward developed economies.  This is particularly crucial 
because the impact of foreign entry may vary with the level of economic development 
(Lensink and Hermes 2004; Claessens, Demirguç-Kunt, and Huizinga, 2001).   10 
As a consequence, scholars have recently turned their attention to the impact of 
foreign entry in middle-income countries. As of yet, however, this literature does not provide 
a consensus set of results as to the likely direction or magnitude of the effects of foreign entry. 
There is evidence from some studies that foreign entry can negatively affect the pricing, level, 
and volatility of credit.  Claessens, Demirguç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) find that foreign 
banks operating in developing economies have higher overhead expenses, charge higher 
interest margins, and earn higher rates of return than domestic banks.  Studies of Argentina 
and Pakistan suggest that foreign banks may also be less willing to extend credit on the basis 
of ―soft knowledge‖ about firms than domestically-owned banks.  Foreign entry may 
therefore give larger firms even greater advantages by exacerbating problems of differential 
access to capital (Clarke, Cull, D’Amato, and Molinari, 2000; Berger, Klapper, and Udell 
2001; Mian 2006).  Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta (2006) find that foreign entry in 
developing economies is associated with a net reduction in total lending to the private sector: 
foreign banks appear to skim off the best credit risks, leaving domestic banks with a pool of 
weaker borrowers from which to select.  A related body of research suggests that foreign 
banks represent a trade-off for a developing country.  Galindo, Micco, and Powell (2004) 
develop a model and present evidence indicating that foreign banks may be less susceptible to 
funding shocks than domestic banks because they can tap capital from their home institutions, 
but at the same time foreign banks are more reactive to shocks that affect expected returns.  
That is, they may be more fickle than domestic lenders, leading to greater banking system 
instability. 
There are also, however, studies that point to the opposite conclusion.  Clarke, Cull, 
and Martínez Peria (2006) find that enterprises in countries with high levels of foreign bank   11 
participation tend to rank interest rates and access to long term loans as lesser constraints on 
their operations and growth than do enterprises in countries with low levels of foreign bank 
participation.  Martínez Peria and Mody (2004), analyzing a group of Latin American cases, 
find that foreign banks charge lower interest rate spreads than domestically-owned banks. 
They also find that foreign bank entry is associated with an overall increase in administrative 
efficiency and a decrease in interest spreads, suggesting that foreign entry spurs competition.  
Denizer (1999), in a study of Turkey, obtains similar results:  foreign entry reduced domestic 
bank overhead expenses as well as bank profitability. Unite and Sullivan (2003) find that 
foreign entry was associated with declines in interest rate spreads, overhead expenses, and 
profits in the Philippines.  Havrylchyk (2006) finds that foreign banks in Poland are more 
efficient than domestic banks. Haber and Musacchio (forthcoming) find that there is little 
difference between foreign and domestic banks in Mexico in cross-section, but that foreign 
banks appear to have purchased under-performing Mexican banks.   
The Fifth and Sixth sections of this paper draw heavily on the econometric techniques 
that have been developed in and refined in this body of literature.   
 
The Literature on the Political Economy of Bank Regulation 
A quite different literature, much of it written by economic historians or political 
scientists, takes a much broader approach. In this literature, banking regulation—and hence 
banking systems—is understood as equilibrium outcomes of a society’s political institutions.   
Thus, the way to think about the impact of any particular change in the organization of a 
banking system, such as the decision to allow foreign entry, is to focus on the ways that 
change affects the incentives of the political and economic agents who operate within that 
system.    12 
This literature takes as its points of departure two core ideas. First, any government 
that is strong enough to arbitrate property rights is also strong enough to seize them for its 
own benefit. Second, the goal of government regulation is not to maximize social welfare; it is 
to sustain the existing political order, and permit the extant ruling groups to continue to rule. 
In order to understand the structure of regulation in any industry, therefore, one must 
understand the institutions that either constrain the government from behaving arbitrarily 
toward property owners or that compensate those property owners for the risk that the 
government will behave arbitrarily.  
The origins of this literature go back at least as far as North and Weingast’s (1989) 
study of the Glorious Revolution in England.  Some of the subsequent literature in this 
tradition focused on Porfirian Mexico, most particularly (Maurer 2002), Haber, Razo, and 
Maurer (2003); Maurer and Gomberg (2004), and Maurer and Haber (2007).  It has also 
spawned studies of other countries, such as Summerhill (forthcoming), as well as multi-
country studies, or cross-country approaches, such as Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006) and 
Haber, North, and Weingast (2007), Quintyn and Verdier (2010), and Calomiris and Haber 
(forthcoming).
2   We draw on this literature, most particularly the theoretical framework 
developed in Calomiris and Haber (forthcoming), in Sections Three and Four of this paper.  
 
The Literature on the Economic and Political History of Banking in Mexico 
Theoretical frameworks must be married to facts in order to provide an interpretation. 
Fortunately, the past decade has given rise to an increasingly well-developed literature on the 
                                                 
2 This literature developed in parallel with a more general literature about the role of 
institutions and economic growth. Notable examples include: Knack and Keefer (1995); 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2005); Engerman et. al., (2012). 
   13 
politics, economics, and history of banking in Mexico.  Much of this literature is focuses on 
the Porfiriato and the Revolution. Salient works include Ludlow and Marichal (1985), Maurer 
(2002), Cerutti and Marichal (2003), Haber, Razo, and Maurer (2003), Maurer and Gomberg 
(2004), and Maurer and Haber (2007).  There is also a increasingly rich literature on the 
economic history of Mexico during the 20
th century, much of it addressing issue related to 
banking and finance, such as Bazdresch and Levy (1991), Izquierdo (1995), Cárdenas (1996, 
2000), Del Ángel-Mobarak (2002), and Moreno-Brid and Ros (2009).  Finally, there is a 
growing and diverse literature, written from a variety of disciplinary perspectives, on the bank 
nationalization of 1982, the privatization of 1991-92, and the subsequent rescue and 
restructuring of the banking system.  Salient works include Gruben and McComb (2003), Del 
Ángel-Mobarak, Bazdresch, and Suárez Dávila (2005), Murillo (2005), Haber (2005), Loaeza 
(2008), Del Ángel-Mobarak and Martinelli Montoya (2009), Suárez Dávila (2010), Espinosa 
Rugarcía and Cárdenas Sánchez (2011), and Haber and Musacchio (forthcoming). We draw 
on this literature in Section Four of this paper.  
 
   14 
Section Three  
Logical Framework  
Facts and data do not speak for themselves. Decisions about the ordering of facts, or 
the specification of statistical tests of data, require an organizing framework.  We therefore 
build upon the framework in Calomiris and Haber (forthcoming) who construct a theory about 
banking systems and political institutions from first principles.  They consider the incentives 
of all of the parties with a direct interest in the banking system—the majority shareholders, 
minority shareholders, depositors, debtors, and government actors—and then consider the 
ways that those parties can negotiate with one another under both autocratic and democratic 
forms of government. They then use this logical framework in order to understand variance in 
the stability and level of credit across societies. 
Rather than recapitulating the (necessarily lengthy) Calomiris and Haber framework in 
its entirety, let us simply present some of its core insights. Their framework starts with the 
observation that underneath the seemingly simple set of transactions that are at the core of the 
business of banking—the pooling of equity and deposits, which are then lent to borrowers—is 
a rather thorny set of property rights problems.  First, bankers (officers, directors, and 
majority shareholders) and the parties who control the government have to create mechanisms 
that either prevent the government from expropriating the banks once they are created, or that 
compensate the bankers for accepting the risk that they may be expropriated.  Second, 
minority shareholders and depositors have to create mechanisms that either prevent the 
bankers from expropriating their capital through fraud or tunneling, or that that compensate 
them for accepting the risk that they may be expropriated.  Third, banks have to create 
mechanisms that prevent borrowers from expropriating bankers, minority shareholders, and   15 
depositors by reneging on loan contracts, or they have to create mechanisms that compensate 
those groups for accepting the risk that they may be expropriated by borrowers. 
These three commitment problems are not independent of each other: solving the 
problem of fraud or tunneling by bankers, and solving the problem of contract enforcement 
with debtors, necessarily involves the regulatory and police powers of the government—but 
any government with police powers strong enough to solve these problems is also strong 
enough to expropriate the banks!  Consider the problem of fraud or tunneling by bank 
insiders: In the final instance, minority shareholders and depositors need the government to 
enforce contracting laws that make banks fulfill their obligations to them, pass and enforce 
laws against tunneling, and improve the chances that banks can be evaluated accurately by 
outsiders through the creation of accounting standards and regulatory and supervisory 
agencies.  Depositors and shareholders also may look to the government to reduce their risks 
by creating de facto or de jure protections against loss (deposit insurance or bailouts).  
Similarly consider the problem of contract enforcement by banks against borrowers: banks 
need the courts and police to enforce loan and other counterparty contracts; without them, 
collateral cannot be repossessed.  
The problem is that the government is not a disinterested, independent party.  This is 
true in three important senses.  First, the coalition of individuals in control of the government 
may have preexisting economic stakes, the value of which depends on the ways financial 
rights are structured and enforced. Second, at the same time that the government is charged 
with enforcing loan contracts against debtors, it may need the political support of those same 
debtors. Third, the government not only plays a large number of supervisory, regulatory, and 
contract enforcement roles, it also looks to the financial system, and in particular the banks, to   16 
finance the state.  That is, the government simultaneously regulates the banks and borrows 
from them. In short, conflicts of interest are baked into banking systems. 
Making matters worse still, the government has multiple margins to behave 
opportunistically toward the banks in order to pursue its own goals.  It can expropriate the 
banks outright; borrow from the banks and then renege on the loans; monetize its debt to the 
banks by printing money; raise reserve requirements and force the banks to hold those 
reserves in government bonds that yield negative real interest rates; or force banks to direct 
loans to government enterprises at below market interest rates.  The government may also 
favor particular groups of bankers, depositors, or debtors because they are politically crucial.  
Examples of these actions by government include regulatory forbearance towards bankers, 
insuring depositors well beyond the statutory limits, directing banks to make loans to 
politically crucial constituencies, and forcing banks to forgive debts.  In addition, the 
government may favor all of these groups—the bankers, minority shareholders, depositors, 
and debtors—through rescues and bailouts that come at the expense of taxpayers.  
These inherent conflicts of interest among government actors imply that there are no 
fully ―private‖ banking systems; rather, all modern banking systems represent a partnership 
between the government and a group of bankers. The basis of this partnership is simple: 
governments trade sets of valuable privileges that are embodied in bank charters in return for 
sources of finance that both fund the state and help maintain the existing political order.  
These sources of finance include purchases of government bonds (which may even be a 
requirement of the bank’s charter), deposit reserves held by the central bank, government 
equity participation in the bank (with the equity paid for through a loan from the bank), and 
taxes on bank capital, earnings, or transactions. As part of the partnership, the government   17 
may also require that the banks allocate credit to groups that are politically crucial to the 
government, such as farmers, homeowners, or industrialists.  In return, the bankers receive the 
charters necessary to operate banks.   
The government charter is not just a license to conduct business: it represents a 
valuable concession.  It grants the shareholders of the bank limited liability, allows the bank 
to hold government deposits, and gives the bank priority in the event of debtor insolvency. In 
fact, the government may decree that certain types of loans are only legally enforceable if 
they are made by a chartered bank. In the event that there is government deposit insurance, 
the government may also restrict coverage to deposits in a chartered bank.  The fewer charters 
are granted, of course, the more valuable is each charter, and thus the larger the share of the 
resulting rents that the government can demand in exchange for the charter.   
Government regulatory policies toward banks are not, therefore, created and enforced 
in order to maximize social welfare.  Rather, they reflect the deals that gave rise to the 
partnerships among governments, bankers, and the interest groups that are crucial to the 
government.  These deals determine which laws are passed, which groups of people have 
licenses to contract with whom, for what, and on what terms. Banks are regulated and 
supervised according to technical criteria, and banking contracts are enforced according to 
abstruse laws, but those criteria and laws are not created and enforced by robots programmed 
to maximize social welfare; they are the outcomes of a political process—a game as it were— 
with the stakes being wealth and power.  
Calomiris and Haber refer to the process by which these government-banker 
partnerships are created as the ―Game of Bank Bargains,‖ and one of their insights is that the 
rules of play vary depending on a society’s underlying political institutions.  When a society’s   18 
institutions do not limit the authority and discretion of government officials, through, for 
example, strong systems of checks and balances, the government can induce bankers to 
deploy their capital in a bank by structuring a deal that raises bankers’ rate of return high 
enough to compensate them for the probability that the government will break its promises 
later. Similarly, minority shareholders must be compensated by high rates of return on capital 
in order to induce them to purchase shares in the bank, because there is no guarantee that the 
government will protect them from fraud or tunneling by the bankers if it is not politically 
convenient to do so.  The most direct way that rates of return for both groups can be increased 
is simply to constrain the number of bank charters.  The implication is that, under autocracy, 
the ―partnership‖ between government and bankers will cause the banking system to strongly 
depart from any notion of allocative efficiency.  Competition will be limited by the need to 
generate the rents necessary to induce investment. The system will be small and inherently 
prone to crises: periodically, the bankers will expropriate the minority shareholders and the 
depositors; and periodically, the government will expropriate everyone. 
One of the insights of Calomiris and Haber is that when the risk of expropriation is 
high, government-created ―safety nets‖ may also be used to entice bankers and minority 
shareholders to play the Game of Bank Bargains. These safety nets not only include limited 
liability for shareholders, but may also include extremely generous deposit insurance, 
government-run resolution authorities, and taxpayer-financed rescues of distressed banks.  
Such safety nets can be thought of as a substitute for capital for the purposes of getting 
deposits into the banks.  When expropriation risk makes paid-in capital costly, the optimal 
bargain may favor a safety net as part of the bargain between the government and the bankers.  
The problem, from the point of view of the government, is that this variant of the   19 
Game of Bank Bargains has built-in incentives for moral hazard.  The creation of a safety net 
puts the government in a vulnerable position: should the banking system fail, taxpayers and 
voters will hold it, and not the bankers, accountable—and that accountability may cost the 
government its hold on power.  In this variant of the game, the parties in control of the 
government therefore need to be careful in choosing their banker-partners.  
 
Implications for Mexico’s Game of Bank Bargains  
As we shall soon see, the way that the game of bank bargains was played by the 
government and Mexico’s bankers from the 1970s onwards meant that, circa 1997, finding 
domestic partners had become problematic for the parties in control of the Mexican 
government.  In the decade leading up to 1982, the government had become increasingly 
opportunistic vis-a-vis its banker partners by unilaterally altering the terms of the partnership.  
It then broke the partnership in 1982 by expropriating the bankers outright.  Only nine years 
later, it sought to sell those same banks back to the private sector—and it sought to maximize 
the price at auction—but the memory of the 1982 expropriation was still fresh in the minds of 
the potential buyers.  In the negotiations between the government and the bankers, therefore, a 
deal was crafted in which the government was able to maximize the price it received, while 
the buyers put up little of their own capital and the government erected a generous safety net. 
That is, the government succeeded in forging a new partnership with a group of bankers, but 
the terms of the deal meant that the bankers had very little to lose if something went wrong, 
while the government had a tremendous amount to lose.  This perverse alignment of 
incentives produced reckless lending from 1992 to 1995, which resulted in the banking crisis 
of 1995-96.  The cost to the PRI of this failed partnership was immense: for the first time in 
its history, it lost control of the Chamber of Deputies in the 1997 midterm elections.  Three   20 
years later, it lost the presidency.   
When the government of Ernesto Zedillo thought about how to craft a stable 
partnership after rescuing the banks in 1995-96, it was therefore very cautious when it came 
to choosing its partners, lest it be politically exposed again.  Rather than choosing to partner 
with domestic financiers, the Zedillo government chose a set of large, foreign-owned banks. 
From the point of view of the Zedillo government, foreign partners had four advantages: 1) 
they could be counted on recapitalize the banks with real (not fictitious) capital; 2) they did 
not own downstream non-financial enterprises that they be induced to save during a crisis by 
tunneling funds from their own banks; 3) they could not reasonably expect to be bailed out by 
the government in the event of a crisis; and 4) their managements might be concerned about 
not running afoul of regulators and stockholders in their home countries.  In short, foreign 
bankers had a lot to lose if they mismanaged their end of the partnership.  
The partnership between the Mexican government and foreign bankers also gained 
strength from the fact that the Mexican government could not easily expropriate foreign banks 
or otherwise reduce their property rights.  Foreign bankers in Mexico, especially those from 
the United States and Canada, knew that they could access protection against the Mexican 
government from their home governments, as well as from international tribunals under 
NAFTA.  Article 1110(1) of NAFTA is quite explicit on this point:  ―No Party may directly or 
indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of another Party … or take a measure 
tantamount to nationalization or expropriation … except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) on a 
nondiscriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of law … and (d) in payment of 
compensation.‖  Article 1139 extends this guarantee against expropriation to all ―property, 
tangible or intangible, acquired in the expectation or used for the purpose of economic benefit   21 
or other business purpose.‖  NAFTA also creates international institutions with the authority 
to sanction signatory governments that violate its terms. Investors who believe that Mexican 
government has violated the terms of the NAFTA may demand compensation and have their 
case judged by a NAFTA tribunal.  Moreover, they can go before a NAFTA tribunal to appeal 
judicial decisions made in Mexico that they consider to be against national or international 
law. The decisions of NAFTA tribunals can be appealed to national courts but only in the 
country where the case is brought. This means that Mexico cannot use its court system to 
overturn summarily the decisions of a NAFTA tribunal. If it did so, thereby violating the 
provisions of NAFTA, the other signatory governments could impose trade sanctions. 
(Condon and Sinha 2003: 127–129).  In short, foreign bankers knew they had protections 
against the Mexican government that Mexican bankers did not have. Those protections meant 
that the Mexican government had a great deal to lose if it mismanaged its end of the 
partnership.  
The result, as we shall see in the pages that follow, has been an impressively stable 
banking system. Indeed, while the United States, Great Britain, and Spain all suffered 
devastating banking crises in 2007-09, the banks from those countries that operate in Mexico 
continued to lend prudently and posted positive rates of return.   
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Section Four 
Mexico’s Uneasy Banking Partnership, 1920-1996 
It is not possible to understand why the Mexican government opened the banking 
system to foreign entry in 1997, without first understanding the events that led up to that 
decision.  We therefore begin by presenting a brief history of the uneasy partnership between 
the government and Mexico’s bankers from the end of the Revolution through the bank 
expropriation of 1982, the privatization of 1991-92, and the collapse and rescue of the 
banking system in 1995-96.  
Though we do not want to short-change the details—indeed, we think they are 
crucial—we wish to highlight three facts.  First, circa 1995-96, the majority of Mexico’s 
banks, especially its largest, were insolvent. Second, that insolvency was the outcome of the 
deals made during the process of bank privatization in 1991-92. Those deals reflected the 
difficulty of forging a partnership between the PRI and the bankers, given the opportunistic 
behavior of the government toward the bankers over the course of the previous two decades.  
Third, the insolvency of the banking system came at a tremendous political cost to the PRI.  
The Mexican public was outraged that the 1995-96 banking crisis had wiped out much of their 
wealth and that they, through the tax system, were paying for its resolution. Indeed, the 
political fallout from the rescue undermined the PRI’s legitimacy and was decisive in shifting 
voter support to the PRD and PAN in the 1997 elections. Surveys indicate that as of 1997 
voters no longer believed that the PRI was a more capable steward of the economy than the 
political opposition (Magaloni 2006: Chap. 7).  
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Tenuous at the Origin 
The origins of the modern Mexican banking system go back to the Porfiriato.  Indeed, 
some of the largest banks in Mexico today, most particularly Banamex and Santander Serfin, 
trace their origins to this period.  We cannot hope to do justice to the voluminous literature on 
this pre-revolutionary banking system.  We can, however, point to three salient features of it. 
First, by the standards of post-revolutionary Mexico it was quite sizable. Maurer (2002: 91), 
estimates gross credit from commercial banks at 25 percent of GDP in 1910.  The ratio of 
total commercial and mortgage bank assets to GDP was 38 percent, roughly the same level as 
today (Maurer and Haber 2007).  Second, it was extraordinarily stable (Maurer and Haber 
2007).   Third, it was based on a partnership between a group of well-connected financiers 
and the government of Porfirio Díaz: in exchange for loans (both to the federal government 
and state governments), Mexico’s bankers were awarded highly profitable segmented 
oligopolies.
3 
Every side during the Mexican Revolution then preyed upon this banking system in 
order to finance their military campaigns.  One of the ironies of the Mexican Revolution was 
that the two figures who were the most closely identified with business interests, Victoriano 
Huerta and Venustiano Carranza, were the most aggressive predators against the banks.  By 
1918, Mexico barely had a banking system: virtually all of the Díaz-era banks had been 
dissolved, save Banamex and the BLM, and those banks had been stripped of most of their 
assets (Maurer 2002).  
                                                 
3  Some salient works in this literature include: Ludlow and Marichal (1985); Maurer 
(2002); Cerutti and Marichal (2003); Haber, Razo, and Maurer (2003); Maurer and Gomberg 
(2004); Maurer and Haber (2007).   24 
The lack of a functioning banking system jeopardized the survival of Mexico’s post-
revolutionary governments.  In fact, calling them governments implies a good deal more 
stability and institutionalization than actually existed.  The Mexican political system in the 
1920s was little more than a fragile coalition of warlords allied to corrupt labor leaders, and 
headed by two political-military strongmen who had been part of the Carrancista movement, 
Alvaro Obregón and Plutarco Elias Calles. The Obregón-Calles regime faced several threats 
to its survival, including two attempted military coups, an armed rebellion led by the 
Secretary of the Treasury, and a church-state civil war.  Obregón and Calles tried to obtain the 
revenues they needed to fight those movements by increasing taxation on mining and 
petroleum, but failed at both. (Haber, Razo, and Maurer, 2003). This meant that they had 
strong incentives to create a banking system from which they could borrow.  At the same 
time, the private sector—most importantly the country’s manufacturers—was clamoring for 
the creation of a banking system that it could use to finance its operations.  Given the fact that 
Obregón and Calles were trying to hold together a fragile coalition, and that a crucial part of 
that coalition  – which even provided paramilitary support – was the country’s newly 
unionized industrial workers, keeping the factories operating was as important as finding a 
source of public finance. 
There were several failed attempts by Obregón to rekindle the banking system in the 
early 1920s, but these fizzled because Obregón soon reneged on whatever promises he made 
to the bankers.
  (Haber, Razo, and Maurer 2003).  Obregón and Calles, therefore, went back to 
the drawing board to come up with a plan to coax the country’s private financiers into 
deploying their capital in a banking system from which the government could borrow.  In 
order to do so, they gave the bankers considerable say in the system’s design. In late 1924,   25 
Secretary of the Treasury Alberto Pani called a special convention of government officials 
and bankers, some of whom had been major figures in the pre-revolutionary banking system. 
That is, the government quite explicitly signaled that it wanted to form a partnership.  
The laws that were crafted at the 1924-25 convention were designed to give the 
bankers incentives to deploy their capital by raising rates of return through the creation of 
barriers to entry. First, all pre-existing banks were grandfathered in.  Second, the incumbent 
bankers were appointed to a newly-created National Banking Commission, giving them 
considerable influence to block the entry of new banks, as well as to influence other aspects of 
banking and credit policy.  Third, in order to make it difficult for other banks to enter the 
market, the minimum capital requirement was set at 500,000 pesos (roughly $250,000), and 
was made higher still for banks that wished to operate a branch or office in Mexico City, 
where the minimum capital was set at one million pesos ($500,000).  Fourth, obtaining a bank 
charter required the specific approval of the Finance Secretary and the President.  Fifth, the 
convention established a new commercial bank, the Banco de México (Banxico), whose 
shares were owned both by private banks and by the government.  The purpose of Banxico 
was three-fold:  to serve as the treasury’s fiscal agent; to rediscount notes from shareholder 
banks; and to advance credit to business enterprises.  (Haber, Razo, and Maurer, 2003). 
Banxico grew out of a political bargain among Mexico’s leading bankers and 
politicians.  The bankers worried about expropriation via forced lending or selective defaults.  
Banxico was therefore granted a monopoly on government lending so that the government 
could not default on loans to some bankers while borrowing more money from others.  If the 
government abrogated one bank’s property rights, it would be abrogating all banks’ property   26 
rights, because they all held stock in Banxico. Safety in numbers meant that collective risk 
was lower risk.  
Although this deal was far from ironclad, it did succeed in coaxing some capital back 
into the banking system.  We should be clear, however, that the resulting banking system was 
miniscule when compared to what had existed prior to the Revolution.  If we leave out 
Banxico, which mostly lent to the government, as well as business enterprises owned by 
members of the government, the ratio of private credit to GDP from the commercial banks 
was only four percent in 1925 and five percent in 1929, which was roughly one-quarter to 
one-third the level in 1910 (See Figure 2).  
Mexico’s bankers had good reason to be wary, because they soon had to contend with 
a party-based dictatorship.  In 1929, in the wake of Obregón’s murder, Calles organized 
Mexico’s remaining military leaders into a political party, the Partido Nacional 
Revolucionario (PNR). A series of reforms in the 1930s integrated Mexico’s organized labor 
movement and peasant confederation into the structure of this party, creating the PRM.  In the 
1940s, the PRM was further reformed, giving rise to the PRI.   
As soon as this party-based dictatorship started to take shape in the 1930s the 
government began to claw back some of the policy-making authority that the Obregón-Calles 
regime had delegated to private bankers.  In 1932, the government converted Banxico into a 
central bank.  A further reform in 1936 required commercial banks to maintain cash reserves 
in Banxico, which is to say that banks had to lend part of their deposit base to the government.  
That same law also transferred many bank supervisory functions from the banker-influenced 
National Banking Commission to Banxico.  In a further set of reforms enacted in 1941, the   27 
government forced commercial banks to divest their investment banking operations into 
separate corporations, called Financieras. (Del Angel Mobarak, 2002, 2005).  
These reforms to bank regulation took place amidst outright expropriations in other 
areas of the economy. Industrialists had been threatened with expropriation when they tried to 
curtail operations during the Great Depression of the 1930s.  The Cárdenas administration had 
seized foreign-owned petroleum companies in 1938, and in that same year the government 
expropriated the country’s largest paper mill so that it could fully control access to newsprint. 
Commercial farmers, of course, had been subject to expropriation ever since the revolution, 
and they had seen many of their best lands taken over during the Cárdenas presidency. 
(Haber, Razo, and Maurer 2003). 
Once the government began to renegotiate the deal that had been forged in 1924-25, 
Mexico’s financiers began to pull back.  As Figure Two shows, the banking system, miniscule 
as it was, actually began to shrink; credit from commercial banks fell from seven percent of 
GDP in 1933 to three percent of GDP by 1939, even though demand for credit was increasing 
because the Mexican economy grew at a brisk pace during the late 1930s.  Commercial bank 
credit would remain at depressed levels for the next 40 years.  This pattern even holds if we 
include credit from the financieras, which bumped up the amount of total private credit from 
privately-owned banks by only a trivial amount until the 1960s.  In fact, the peak level of 
combined commercial bank and financiera lending was only 17 percent of GDP, and that level   28 
was not reached until 1972.  That is to say, during the period 1925 to 1978, the amount of 
credit issued by private banks (relative to GDP) likely never exceeded its 1910 levels.
4  
The pervasive distrust of the government by Mexico’s leading financiers presented the 
PRI with a problem: the party needed an alternative to private banks as a means to support a 
growing economy in order to sustain its hold on power.  To solve that problem, the PRI 
created a broad array of government-owned development banks.  The first of these had been 
founded in the 1920s to provide credit to agriculture—as well as to provide loans to 
revolutionary generals turned landowners—but in the 1930s and 1940s government-owned 
banks mushroomed, and they were increasingly used to provide long-term finance for 
Mexico’s growing manufacturing sector.  As Figure Two shows, by the 1950s, credit from 
development banks exceeded credit from commercial banks and financieras combined.  
Indeed, by the 1970s, credit from the government-owned development banks so dwarfed 
credit from commercial banks and financieras that the government allowed these privately-
owned banks to merge, creating enterprises called multi-banks. 
In theory, government development banks were supposed to provide credit to small 
and medium-sized enterprises, in order to level the playing field against the large industrial 
conglomerates that mobilized credit from the commercial banks and financieras. Mexico’s 
industrial conglomerates typically owned both a commercial bank and a financiera, and the 
portfolios of those banks tended to be composed of shares held in the enterprises that were 
part of the conglomerates. (Del Angel Mobarak, 2002). The commercial banks and financieras 
                                                 
4 We assume that the Díaz-era commercial banks had a fairly standard loan-assets ratio 
of roughly 50 percent, an assumption that squares with what we know about the composition 
of their balance sheets. Thus, their ratio of assets to GDP of 32 percent in 1910 would 
translate into a loan to GDP ratio of 16 percent. Data from Maurer and Haber (2007).   29 
were, in essence, the treasury divisions of the conglomerates. As a practical matter, however, 
the government-owned development banks tended to allocate most of their credit to the very 
same industrial conglomerates that received financing from the privately-owned banking 
system.  The political pressure to lend to large firms, which tended to have large, unionized, 
and politically influential labor forces, simply outweighed whatever original mandate the 
development banks may have had.  This meant that industrial and commercial conglomerates 
could fund risky enterprises through the development banks rather than from the private banks 
that were under their control. (Cárdenas, 2000: 190, 195).  
The commercial banks, financieras, and development banks therefore all worked 
together to finance Mexico’s largest industrial and commercial enterprises. The development 
banks tended to serve as second tier lenders, repurchasing loans made by commercial banks 
through special programs designed to channel credit to sectors that the government deemed 
crucial.  In fact, the credit law of 1941 actually required commercial banks to allocate 60 
percent of their loans to such directed credit programs. (Del Angel Mobarak, 2002). These 
directed-credit programs represented a government guarantee to the banks because all of the 
default risk was born by the development bank.  Not surprising, as Del Angel Mobarak (2002) 
has shown, Mexico’s commercial banking system was stable and profitable.  
For all its ―stability,‖ however, the bottom line was a system that encouraged reckless 
behavior: shareholders and depositors in commercial banks and financieras did not bear the 
risk of loans gone bad; rather, the risk was borne by taxpayers who ultimately subsidized the 
development banks. Not only did the development banks serve as second tier lenders, thereby 
taking risky loans off of the balance sheets of the commercial banks, development banks also 
made direct loans to private manufacturers, further subsidizing large industrial firms as well   30 
as the private banks that were affiliated with them.  The largest development bank, Nacional 
Financiera (NAFIN), founded in 1934, obtained its capital by selling government-guaranteed 
bonds and then made long-term loans to manufacturers that were collateralized by blocks of 
shares issued by those firms. NAFIN was supposed to provide credit to small and mid-sized 
manufacturing companies, which were often unable to obtain financing from commercial and 
financieras. As a practical matter, however, NAFIN allocated most of its credit to the very 
same industrial conglomerates that received financing from private banks. (Cárdenas 2000: 
190).  Worse, because of the political importance of their workforces, the government came to 
use NAFIN as a mechanism to bail out manufacturers that were not economically viable.  
Even worse, the policy of bailouts encouraged moral hazard: knowing that they would be 
bailed out, manufacturers undertook high-risk activities of doubtful expected profitability. 
(Cárdenas, 2000:195.)  The end result was that the Mexican government, which is to say 
Mexican taxpayers, came to own a wide range of commercial and industrial enterprises of 
dubious value, including sugar refiners, steel mills, mining companies, railroads, airlines, and 
hotels. In 1970 there were 85 state-owned firms. By 1976 there were 740. In 1982 there were 
1,155. (Valdés Ugalde, 1994; Cárdenas 2000: 195; Smith 1991: 371). 
 
Ending the Partnership: The Bank Expropriation of 1982 
The partnership between Mexico’s bankers and the PRI was always fragile.  It was 
based on the fact that the bankers and the manufacturers were one-and-the-same, that the PRI 
needed to reward organized labor for its political support; and that those organized workers 
were employed by the same industrial conglomerates that were owned by the bankers. The   31 
implication is that if the political calculus of the PRI leadership changed, there was little that 
the bankers could do to protect themselves against expropriation.  
The change in calculus occurred in the 1970s, as government expenditures began to 
outstrip revenues by a wide margin—and it resulted in the unwinding of the partnership. 
During the 1950s, the Mexican government had run balanced budgets; the fiscal deficit was 
typically on the order of 0.1 percent of GDP.  In the 1960s, however, it began to spend at a 
rate that outpaced growth in its revenues: deficits began to escalate, averaging 1.9 percent of 
GDP across the decade. The situation worsened during the 1970s; the fiscal deficit averaged 
6.6 percent of GDP. By 1981, the deficit was a staggering 14 percent of the GDP. (Bazdresch 
and Levy, 1991: 249). 
Unwilling to bear the political costs of raising taxes or cutting expenditures, the 
government directed the central bank to expand the money supply, which had the predictable 
effect of raising the rate of inflation. The average annual rate of inflation in Mexico 
accelerated from 2.7 percent in the 1960s to 16.8 percent during the 1970s. By 1981, it hit 
27.9 percent. The Mexican government was, in short, financing its deficits through an 
inflation tax.   
Inflation taxes can, of course, be shared with commercial banks. In fact, the inflation 
tax was a considerable source of profits for Brazilian commercial banks in the 1960s and 
1970s. (Lees, Botts, and Cysne, 1991).  An inflation tax is essentially, the amount of real 
interest earned by the monetary authorities on the stock of M1.  This stock of M1 earns zero 
nominal interest.  Some of M1, of course, is held by commercial banks in the form of demand 
deposits. Thus, if the deposit reserve requirement of the central bank is set at zero, all 
revenues from the inflation tax earned on demand deposits accrue to the commercial banks,   32 
and all revenues from the inflation tax on cash accrue to the government. This situation, of 
course, rarely happens; governments typically want to garner revenues from the inflation tax 
on demand deposits, and therefore typically increase deposit reserve requirements when they 
are running an inflation tax.
5    
There was not much sharing of the inflation tax with commercial banks in Mexico.  
Echeverría and López Portillo dramatically raised bank reserve requirements. Reserve ratios 
climbed from just three percent of deposits in 1959 to 46 percent by 1979. (IMF, International 
Financial Statistics Database).  The central bank paid interest on those reserves, but that 
interest rate was below the rate of inflation. In addition, the government established interest 
rate ceilings. (Del Angel Mobarak 2002: 285). Inasmuch as a the Banco de México held a 
large proportion of private banks’ deposits, earning interest rates lower than those available 
on alternative investments, and banks could only make private loans subject to interest rate 
caps, the banks responded by offering interest rates on deposits that were lower than the 
prevailing rate of inflation. As a result, depositors began to withdraw their money from the 
banking system. The ratio of bank deposits to GDP had been climbing, growing from 17 
percent in 1960 to 29 percent by 1969.  The inflation tax caused disintermediation: by 1979, 
the ratio of deposits to GDP had fallen back to 24 percent (World Bank, Financial Structure 
Database, November 2010 update).  
The combination of falling deposits and increased lending to the government (through 
higher reserve requirements) had a predictable effect: The supply of bank credit for private 
purposes declined dramatically. As Figure 2 shows, the ratio of credit from commercial banks 
                                                 
5 This sharing of the inflation tax between the government and the banks on demand 
deposits can be thought of as the real interest earned by the banks on demand deposits minus 
the real interest on total reserve requirements they have to pay the monetary authorities.   33 
and financieras, relative to GDP, had reached 17 percent in 1970.  By 1977, it had fallen to 
only 11 percent. At this point, Mexico’s bankers began to express concern that they were 
going to be expropriated. (Del Angel Mobarak and Martinelli Montoya 2009: 21). 
The situation facing bankers turned worse in the early 1980s. In addition to printing 
money to fund escalating deficits, López Portillo borrowed heavily abroad, believing that a 
combination of rising petroleum prices and discoveries of new reserves in the Gulf of Mexico 
would allow him to service the growing debt.   When the price of oil collapsed, beginning in 
early 1982, López Portillo had to scramble to avoid a foreign debt default. He converted U.S. 
dollar-denominated savings accounts into pesos at the official rate of exchange (which was 
approximately one-third less than the rate on the parallel exchange market), thereby 
expropriating the assets of individuals and firms holding dollar accounts. When that proved 
insufficient, he declared that the government was temporarily suspending payments on 
Mexico’s foreign debt, a step that only accelerated the run on the peso.  
Citizens and business enterprises responded by converting their peso assets to dollars, 
which they then moved out of the country partly aided by commercial banks. López Portillo 
responded by blaming the bankers for the collapse of the exchange rate, and expropriated the 
banks on September 1, 1982 with the stroke of a pen; the expropriation, which required a 
constitutional amendment, was ratified by the Mexican congress with virtually no debate. 
(Del Angel Mobarak, 2005).
6 The bankers received compensation in the form of government 
bonds, but these were of dubious value; after all, the government had already stopped 
payment on its foreign debt and the country was entering a hyperinflation.  
                                                 
6 Del Angel Mobarak and Martinelli Montoya (2009) develop a game-theoretic model in which the 
government saw the end of its partnership with bankers when the bankers aided in the speculation against the 
peso. In their model, the government had to pursue expropriation in order to show that its threats were credible.    34 
For the next seven years, Mexico’s banks continued to take deposits and clear checks, 
but they directed more than half of their lending to public-sector loans to fund government 
budget deficits.  As a consequence, firms and households were starved for credit.  By 1988 the 
ratio of private-sector loans to GDP was only 8 percent. (IMF, International Financial 
Statistics Database). Worse, much of that private credit was directed to politically-crucial 
producer and consumer groups based on criteria other than economic viability.  Thus, in the 
late 1980s the ratio of non-performing to total loans began to climb markedly. That is, the 
government may have owned the banks, but those banks were becoming increasingly 
unprofitable. (Gunther, Moore, and Short, 1996).  
 
How Do You Sell Something that You Just Stole? 
The Mexican economy limped along for the next several years, the government 
simultaneously trying to fight an inflation rate that sometimes exceeded 100 percent, growing 
unemployment, and the national private sector’s fundamental lack of confidence in the PRI.   
President López Portillo’s successor, Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (1982-88), did what he 
could, but what he could was limited by a fundamental fact: the Mexican government had 
been growing beyond its means for close to two decades.  President de la Madrid could 
neither raise taxes effectively, nor borrow abroad, to finance these deficits.  He therefore 
focused on cutting spending, and opening up the economy to foreign trade.  
When President Carlos Salinas de Gortari came to office in 1988 he therefore still 
faced a hyper-inflation, a slow growing economy, a massive public sector debt, and thousands 
of poorly performing state-owned enterprises. He also headed a party that was rapidly losing 
legitimacy. Indeed, his election produced the smallest margin in the history of the PRI, and   35 
even that outcome was widely asserted to be the product of fraud.
7 This last fact cannot be 
stressed strongly enough.  Salinas was not just charged with getting the economy back on 
track; the fate of the PRI rested in his hands.  
Salinas’ solution to these overlapping fiscal and political challenges was to sell off 
state-owned enterprises. Their sale not only provided the government with extraordinary 
revenues that it used to pay down the public debt, but it also reduced the drain that those 
(perennially unprofitable) firms put on the annual budget, thereby helping to bring inflation 
under control. The sale of state-owned enterprises also provided the Salinas government with 
one-time revenues that could be used as partial funding for the social programs that were a 
crucial part of the PRI’s strategy to win the 1994 presidential elections and reestablish its 
political dominance. (Magaloni, 2006).  
The combination of these fiscal and political considerations meant that the Salinas 
government sought to sell the banks in as short a time period as possible and maximize the 
revenues from that sale. The result was that the process of bank privatization was 
accomplished in just 18 months.  It also meant that the government earned $12.4 billion 
dollars from the sale—three times the book value of the banks. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 When federal electoral officials began counting ballots on the evening of July 6, 
1988, the early returns (principally from Mexico City and the surrounding area, where anti-
PRI opposition was strongest) put opposition candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas in the lead.  
Vote tallies arriving later from other parts of the country favored the PRI, but Ministry of the 
Interior officials feared the worst, panicked, and claimed that a computer failure prevented 
them from releasing preliminary results. The PRI then claimed victory for Salinas. When the 
Federal Electoral Commission announced official results a week later, it declared Salinas the 
winner.   36 
Bank Privatization Amidst Expropriation Risk 
Why, one might ask, would investors pay high three times book value for banks that 
the government had seized only nine years before?  Why wouldn’t they have offered a low 
price, to compensate them for the risk that the government might just expropriate them all 
over again?  
Mexico’s bankers had good reason to harbor these fears. President Salinas might have 
been pro-business, but there was no telling what his successors might want to do, and there 
were few checks on presidential power.  The Mexican president could, as a practical matter, 
reduce property rights at will.  Moreover, the Mexican government, as the bankers well knew, 
did not have to engage in de jure expropriation.  It had a broad range of methods by which it 
could carry out a de facto expropriation, all of which it had used in the 1970s: increase deposit 
reserve requirements; finance deficits by increasing the money supply, thereby setting off an 
inflation that would essentially be a tax on the holders of cash; or impose interest rate ceilings, 
driving profit margins to zero.  
Forging a partnership between the Salinas government and Mexico’s bankers was not, 
therefore, an easy process.  The government wanted to sell something that it had expropriated 
only nine years before, and it wanted to maximize the price it received.  The bankers wanted 
the banks back, but as a general rule, bankers who face expropriation risk do not pay price 
premiums for banks.  Nevertheless, the incentives of the government and the bankers were 
aligned through a deal that minimized the amount of capital that the bankers had at risk.  This 
deal was not created in a single stroke.  Rather, it emerged over time, out of the interaction of 
the government and the bankers during the process of privatization and afterwards: each 
discrete decision or agreement driving the next decision or agreement.  The outcome of this   37 
game, however, was a banking system in which the group that had the most at risk—Mexico’s 
taxpayers (who would have to fund the deposit insurance system in the event of bank 
insolvency)—had no active voice in the game as it was being played.  
The key to the government-banker partnership was that the bankers did not have to put 
much of their own capital at risk. How they did this warrants a prolonged discussion about the 
technical process of the bank auction and manner in which the auction winners were able to 
pay for the banks, but before we get too far into the details we wish to stress that, as a 
conceptual matter, the deal that was crafted ultimately amounted to an agreement to shift 
liability to Mexican taxpayers in the event that the partnership proved to be unprofitable for 
the bankers.  That is, bankers entered into a partnership with the government, limiting their 
liability and the limiting the amount of capital they put at risk.  In return, the government 
received a large, one-time infusion of cash.  In order to induce firms and households to 
deposit funds into this under-capitalized system, the government erected a very generous 
safety net: deposit insurance was unlimited.  The government was, in essence, saying that if 
something went wrong, it assumed liability. As we shall see, when the partnership collapsed 
and bill came due, Mexico’s taxpayers blamed the government of Carlos Salinas. 
 
The Auction Process 
Let us then start with the auction process itself.  In structuring the auction, the 
government signaled bidders that they would not have to operate in a competitive 
environment.  The Mexican banking industry at the time of privatization in 1991 was 
composed of 18 banks, four of which controlled 70 percent of total bank assets.  The 
government did not break these up, but sold them as is. The government also signaled 
potential bidders that they would not have to compete against foreign banks.  Foreign banks   38 
were not allowed to participate in the 1991-92 bank auctions.  They had also already been 
effectively excluded from the Mexican market during the negotiations over NAFTA.
8  The 
government was, in effect, selling the rights to operate an oligopoly.
9  
At the same time that the government signaled bankers that they were purchasing 
secure oligopolies, it structured the auction process so as to maximize the prices on offer.  The 
formal rules of the auction specified that bids would be sealed and that the managerial 
expertise of the bidding groups would be taken into account.  (Unal and Navarro 1999).  The 
notion that the government would take the quality of management into account was, however, 
eviscerated by a decision to only do so if the second highest bid was within three percent of 
the first highest.  
                                                 
8 The provisions governing banking in the 1994 NAFTA agreement severely limited 
the participation of foreign banks in Mexico. NAFTA provided that U.S. and Canadian banks 
could own no more than 30% of a Mexican bank’s capital.  It also provided that U.S. and 
Canadian banks could not purchase a controlling interest in any Mexican bank whose market 
share exceeded 1.5 percent and that the total market share under their control could not 
exceed eight percent. This restriction meant that foreign banks were effectively excluded from 
the market, because there were only two banks with market shares of 1.5 percent or less. Over 
a six-year transitional period U.S. and Canadian banks could gradually hold larger market 
shares, up to a maximum of 15 percent by the year 2000.   Even after this transitional period, 
however, NAFTA allowed the Mexican government the right to freeze the purchases of 
Mexican banks by U.S. and Canadian concerns for a three-year period if foreign banks as a 
group controlled more than 25 percent of the market.  Foreign banks were also still subject to 
the rule that they could own no more than 30 percent of a Mexican bank’s stock.  (Murillo 
2005).  
 
9 There exists some debate in the literature as to whether Salinas insisted on excluding 
foreign banks from the market, both during the NAFTA negotiations and during the 
privatization, because he sought to signal that he was selling a secure oligopoly (e.g. Haber 
2005), or because he had sound economic reasons for believiing that the payments system 
must be in the hands of Mexican bankers (e.g., Suárez Dávila 2010). Regardless of Salinas’s 
intentions, from the point of view of Mexico’s bankers, the exclusion of foreign banks from 
the market would have caused them to bid more aggressively; they knew that foreign entrants 
could not reduce their market power.    39 
Consistent with its goal of maximizing prices on offer, the government also did not 
bring Mexico’s accounting standards in line with generally accepted accounting standards. 
One of the most lenient of Mexico’s bank accounting rules was that when a loan was past due, 
only the interest in arrears was counted as non-performing. The principal of such loans could 
be rolled over, and counted as a performing asset.  Moreover, the past due interest could be 
rolled into the principal and the capitalized interest could be recorded as income.  Reforming 
this rule (as well as others that inflated bank capital and assets) would have lowered the 
market value of the banks, because it would have increased the ratio of non-performing to 
total loans, lowered the banks’ reported rates of return, and decreased the book value of assets 
(Del Angel Mobarak, Haber, and Musacchio 2006). How much lower the banks would have 
been valued is difficult to know.  It is known, however, that the government contracted 
outside consulting firms to provide it with a valuation of the banks.  It did not, however, make 
the results of those studies public. (Unal and Navarro, 1999).  
The bankers were not, therefore, able to conduct a detailed analysis of the quality of 
the assets prior to the auction.  They were promised, instead, that after they purchased the 
banks they could receive reimbursements from the government for assets that were not 
properly valued.  There is evidence, however, that the government did not honor this promise. 
Indeed, bankers who participated in the auctions report that the government refused to 
reimburse them for assets that were non-performing.  One prominent banker went so far as to 
say that the auction process therefore amounted to being asked to bid on a house by only 
looking at it from the outside with the doors and windows shut tight. (Espinosa Rugarcía and 
Cárdenas Sánchez, 2011, Vol 3: 55, 73).    40 
The government then auctioned the banks sequentially.  Rather than a single round of 
sealed bids, the government sold the banks in six rounds of bidding between June 1991 and 
July 1992. This increased competition for the banks in the later rounds, thus creating a 
―cascade effect.‖  As Table 2 shows, the most important determinant of the price paid for a 
bank (in terms of its bid-to-book ratio) was the bidding round in which it was purchased.  All 
things being equal (size of bank, profitability, number of bidders) each additional round of 
bidding pushed up the bid-to-book ratio by .30. This ratio is stable across alternative 
specifications and is always significant at the one percent level.  In fact, bidding round is the 
only statistically significant variable that has a positive sign in the regressions.  Surprisingly, 
neither the rate of return on assets, the rate of return on equity, nor the number of bidders is 
statistically significant.
10  Perhaps most surprisingly, the market power of a bank (measured as 
the log of bank assets) is statistically significant, but it has the wrong sign: market power is 
negatively correlated with the bid to book ratio. This is not the outcome that one would expect 
from theory: one would usually expect that the market power of a bank would be capitalized 
in its auction price.
11  
                                                 
10 We measure profitability as both the rate of return on assets and the rate of return on 
equity over the three years prior to the auction.  
 
11  One might argue that the positive correlation between the bid-to-book ratio and the 
bidding round is an artifact of the way we measure the bidding variable (a single variable with 
a range of 1-6, corresponding to each bidding round).  We therefore re-estimated the 
regressions measuring bidding round as a series of dummy variables.  The results are 
consistent with the results in Table 2.  We therefore do not reproduce them here.    
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This set of institutional arrangements produced an average (weighted) bid-to-book 
ratio of 3.04, and an income of $12.4 billion for the Mexican government.
12  Indeed, bid-to-
book ratios of 3.04 suggest that the government received a substantial premium. In United 
States bank mergers during the 1980s, for example, the average bid-to-book ratio was 1.89 
(Unal and Navarro, 1999: 78).  Mexico’s bid-to-book ratios were also high by European 
standards: in European bank privatizations the typical bid-to-book ratio was on the order of 
2.5—and European bankers did not face the same expropriation and default risk as did 
Mexican bankers.  Moreover, research by Gunther, Moore, and Short (1996) indicates that the 
share of past due loans, the return on banking assets, and the industry’s capital to asset ratio 
were all moving in a direction indicating increasing weakness among Mexico’s government-
owned banks, even before they were auctioned.  An analysis by Unal and Navarro (1999) of 
the market value of traded shares around the time of the auction is consistent with the 
Gunther, Moore, and Short view: the prices paid at auction carried a premium of 45 percent 
over the value of that equity as priced by the Mexican stock market. 
 
Weak Monitoring, Reckless Lending 
Reckless behavior by banks is typically prevented by monitoring by three groups: 
bank shareholders (who operate through directors), bank depositors, and government 
supervisors.  If the first two groups have substantial money at risk, government supervision is 
superfluous.  Indeed, most of the world’s banking systems ran without much in the way of 
government supervision until the mid 20
th century.  The weaker are the incentives of 
                                                 
12 A bid to book ratio of 3.53 is commonly cited in the literature.  This is the 
unweighted average.  But, Mexico’s largest banks actually received lower multiples of their 
book value when they were auctioned than the smaller banks.    42 
shareholders and depositors to monitor the bankers, however, the more crucial is the role of 
government supervisors.  
The shareholders of Mexico’s banks did not, however, have very much capital at risk.  
They therefore were weak monitors.  Their lack of risk was an outcome of the payment plan 
that the bankers had brokered with the government. The original payment plan devised by the 
government called for a 30 percent payment three days after the announcement of the auction 
winner, with the remaining 70 percent due in 30 days.  The winners of the auctions, which is 
to say that majority shareholders who were to become the directors, convinced the 
government, however, to replace those rules with one that gave them time to finance their 
purchases with outside sources of funds.  Under the new plan, the first payment was reduced 
to 20%, a second payment of 20% was to be paid 30 days later, and the remaining 60% was to 
be paid four months after that. They then used the five-month period between the auction and 
the final payment to raise the funds to purchase the banks from outside investors. (Unal and 
Navarro, 1999).  These funds came from a variety of sources—small Mexican investors, 
commercial paper, foreign banks, other Mexican banks, and in some cases, the same bank that 
had been purchased.  That is, shareholders were able to finance or refinance their share 
purchases with a loan from the same bank they were purchasing, with the collateral for the 
loan being the shares that were being purchased.  In the case of Bancomer, which was the 
largest bank in the system, 20 percent of the first payment made to the government by the 
winning bidders was actually financed by a loan to the bidders from that same bank, a fact 
that its pre-1982 owner characterized as ―monstrous.‖ (Espinosa Rugarcía and Cárdenas 
Sánchez, 2011, Vol 3: 11-12).  In another case, a group of purchasers actually financed 75   43 
percent of the total cost of acquiring a bank through a loan from that same bank.  (Mackey 
1999: 55, 61, 141, 216).
13  
The lack of effective monitoring by majority shareholders meant, of course, that 
Mexico’s depositors faced considerable risk. They were not sheep to be fleeced.  Thus, the 
logic of the situation now required that they too be protected.  As a technical matter, bank 
deposits in Mexico were insured by a Trust Fund (FOBAPROA), up to the available resources 
held by FOBAPROA.  These resources were the premiums paid by banks, and were very 
limited.  As a practical matter, however, FOBAPROA had the ability to borrow from the 
Banco de México.  According to Mexico’s Law of Credit Institutions, the Technical 
Committee of FOBAPROA (on which sat representatives from the Ministry of the Treasury, 
the National Banking Commission, and the Banco de México) made recommendations that 
were forwarded to the governor of the Banco de México, who then acted on behalf of the 
bank, in its capacity as FOBAPROA’s fiduciary trustee and legal representative (Mackey 
1999: 44).  
The Banco de México’s guarantee, moreover, was not just implicit, as a consequence 
of its fiduciary relationship to FOBAPROA.  It was an explicit promise.  The Banco de 
México was supposed to publish, in December of each year, the maximum amount of 
obligations that would be protected by FOBAPROA during the following year. Instead, its 
                                                 
13 In the case of Banca Serfin (Mexico’s third largest) an additional departure from the 
usual procedures might also have reduced the director’s capital at risk.   Unlike its practice in 
all the other bank auctions, the government held back 16% of the stock from the bidding 
process. This remaining 16 percent was a purchasing option for the group that bought the 
bank that they could exercise after the auction process closed. (Unal and Navarro, 1999).   
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1993 and 1994 statements did not actually list amounts, but provided the following blanket 
statement:  
―Based on Section IV of Article 122 of the Law of Credit Institutions, and considering 
that it has been a tradition that the Mexican financial authorities try to protect investors from 
any loss in case of insolvency of Credit Institutions, the FOBAPROA’s Technical Committee 
has decided to continue with such tradition, for this reason it has been agreed that 
FOBAPROA will endeavor to honor all of the liabilities charged to financial institutions that 
participate in the fund, provided that they are derived from their operations, excluding 
liabilities arising from subordinated debentures, liabilities resulting from illicit, irregular, or 
bad faith operations…‖ (As quoted in Mackey 1999: 53).
14 
The Banco de México explicitly stated that it was not only guaranteeing all deposits 
(including interbank deposits), it was also guaranteeing virtually all bank liabilities (deposits, 
loans, and credits) with the exception of subordinated debt. Making matters worse, there were 
no general guidelines regarding limitations and restrictions on the whole range of 
FOBAPROA programs.  Rather, participation was to be determined on a case-by-case basis  
(Mackey 1999: 52).  In short, the government signed a blank check in case catastrophe struck. 
This decision by the Banco de México eviscerated the incentives of depositors to 
monitor the banks. Precisely because there was unlimited deposit insurance, bank depositors 
did not police banks by withdrawing funds from banks with risky loan portfolios.  Research 
by Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) that analyzes changes in time deposits and interest 
                                                 
14 From 1995 to 1997, the statement was amended slightly, by adding the following 
phrase ―and liabilities derived from loans granted between banking institutions participating 
in funds transfer systems administered by the Bank of Mexico, to back up obligations 
chargeable to the Bank of Mexico, as well as liabilities in favour of intermediaries belonging 
to the same financial group as the bank.‖ (Mackey 1999: 53).   45 
rates in Mexico from 1991 to 1996 finds that various measures of banks’ riskiness did not 
influence deposit growth through September 1995.  
 There is a well-known, inverse relationship between the extent of deposit insurance 
and the need for government supervision of banks: by reducing the incentives for depositors 
to monitor bank managers and directors, generous deposit insurance places a heavy burden on 
government supervision.  It is rarely the case that government supervisors can monitor 
everything that goes on inside a bank, and thus generous deposit insurance is usually 
associated with unstable banking systems (Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane, 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004).   
Making matters even worse, Mexico’s supervisors were inexperienced and were 
equipped with only the bluntest of instruments.  Bear in mind that during the 1980s, when the 
government ran the banks, there was little need for supervision, because most lending 
consisted of government bond purchases.  Moreover, it was the government itself, seeking to 
maximize prices on offer, which had designed Mexico’s extremely permissive bank 
accounting standards.  Complicating the job of supervisors even further was the fact that, 
prior to 1995, the Comissión Nacional Bancaria (CNB) did not have sufficient information 
technologies on hand to actually gather information from the banks in a timely manner.  It 
also lacked the authority and autonomy to properly supervise the banks (Mackey 1999: 97).  
Mexico’s bankers may, in fact, have expected a high degree of regulatory forbearance. 
(Gruben and McComb 1997).  
Mexico’s bankers therefore faced an amazingly weak set of monitors.  Little wonder, 
then, that they did not invest in internal systems of credit analysis. Indeed, as Mackey 
(1999:56) has pointed out, banks’ internal credit systems were weak to the point of being non-  46 
existent.  Making matters worse, reports drawn on borrowers from private credit reporting 
companies could not be used as a substitute for weak internal institutions.  There was, in fact, 
virtually no private credit reporting in Mexico until 1995. (Negrin, 2000;  Mackey 1999: 25).  
 
The Consequences of Weak Monitoring 
The lack of effective monitoring meant that the Mexican banking system quickly 
began to accumulate a large volume of non-performing loans.  As Table 3 demonstrates, when 
we sum the value of declared non-performing loans (which only included past due interest) to 
the value of ―rediscounts‖ (the rolled over principal of those non-performing loans), as early 
as December 1991 more than 13 percent of the loan portfolios of Mexico’s banks were non-
performing. By December 1993 the rate was over 16 percent.  
Thus, the Mexican banking system was poised for collapse even before the peso 
devaluation of December 1994 (the so-called Tequila Crisis), which caused the central bank 
to raise interest rates and generated widespread default among borrowers with variable rate 
loans. Gonzalez-Hermosillo, Pazarbasioglu, and Billings (1997) have demonstrated this using 
a hazard model to predict bank failure after privatization through 1995.  Their results show 
that it was not the macroeconomic shock of the 1994-96 peso crisis that led to bank failure.  
Rather, that event served as a tipping point for banks that were fragile to begin with. 
How the banking system came to this precarious situation is the subject of some 
debate.  There is widespread agreement that the root cause was ineffective monitoring.  There 
is not, however, agreement on whether ineffective monitoring allowed inexperienced and 
over-optimistic bankers to act in an imprudent manner or whether ineffective monitoring 
allowed bankers to engage in tunneling.  The two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive: both 
could have been going on.      47 
The first view—that bankers were inexperienced and overly-optimistic—stresses that 
the level of financial penetration in Mexico in 1991 was quite low by the standards of 
developed countries, and thus bankers perceived that there would be lucrative returns from 
entering the underserved Mexican market.  (Mansell-Carstens, 1996: 294-96).  This view also 
stresses that the bankers evidently believed that they had purchased secure oligopolies. 
(Gruben and Welch 1996).  They underestimated, however, the degree to which banking 
markets in Mexico were contested.  Thus, the bankers found themselves in a scramble for 
market share.  As Gruben and McComb (1997 and 2003) have shown, Mexico’s banks 
competed so aggressively for market share that they operated beyond the point where 
marginal costs equaled marginal revenue.   
The inexperienced banker view would also stress that Mexican bankers neither knew 
how difficult it would be to assess credit risks, nor understood how difficult it would be to 
enforce their property rights once borrowers reneged.  Bankruptcy procedures in Mexico were 
(and still are) cumbersome in the extreme.  Not only did the country have few bankruptcy 
judges, the bankruptcy law required judges to pass resolutions on each and every objection 
presented by debtors.  Debtors could therefore delay the recovery of property by raising long 
strings of objections—and they could obtain information about how to file these objections 
from publications of the country’s various debtor organizations.  In addition, even when 
favorable judgments were rendered, they were not always enforced.  As a consequence, the 
attempt to recover collateral through the legal system often took between three and seven   48 
years.  (Mackey 1999: 101).   As a consequence, collateral recovery rates were amazingly 
low: five percent in 1991 and 1992, seven percent in 1993, and nine percent in 1994.
15   
The second view, which we will call the tunneling view, would stress that Mexico’s 
bankers were not sheep to be fleeced, they were experienced businessmen who understood the 
environment in which they operated. It would also stress the fact that some of the banks had 
been purchased with funds from those same banks, in which the collateral for the loans were 
the bank shares. (Mackey 1999: 141).  Finally, it would stress the fact that evidence from later 
in the 1990s (the period 1995-98, when the government was intervening insolvent banks) 
indicates that the bankers had engaged in widespread insider lending, and that the loans they 
made to themselves had lower interest rates, higher rates of default, and lower rates of 
collateral recovery than unrelated arm’s-length loans. (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Zamarripa 2003.)   
There is not yet sufficient evidence to adjudicate between these two views. The 
inexperienced banker view receives considerable support from the fact that in 1996 there were 
roughly 1.75 million debtors who participated in various government-run, debtor relief 
programs. (Mackey 1999: 92).   The tunneling view receives considerable support from the La 
Porta et. al. research on the higher propensity of related loans to go in to default.   La Porta et. 
al, however, focus on the period when the banks were already being intervened and/or bailed 
out by the government.  Mexico’s bankers may have realized that they were about to lose 
control of their banks, and thus had strong incentives to make loans to themselves that they 
                                                 
15 The situation was actually much worse than these figures indicate, because 
Mexico’s departure from generally accepted accounting practices lowered the reported levels 
of non-performing loans.  See Table 3 for the sources from which we made these estimates.    49 
did not intend to repay. An analysis of loan portfolios during the period 1991-95 would help 
adjudicate between the two hypotheses.  
 
The Expansion of Credit and the Growth of Non-Performing Loans    
Regardless of the specific mechanism, one thing is certain: bank credit in Mexico 
grew at a prodigious rate. As Table 4 demonstrates, total real bank lending almost doubled in 
the space of just three years (1991-94). Housing loans grew at an even faster rate: from 
December 1991 to December 1994 real lending for housing and real estate nearly tripled.  
Moreover, this is a lower bound estimate of the growth of housing lending because it includes 
only performing loans.  Much of the housing portfolio was non-performing, and the principal 
value and past due interest of those loans were continually rolled over into an accounting 
category called ―rediscounts.‖ (See Table 4).  Inasmuch as the value of rediscounts was nearly 
equal to the total value of housing loans in December 1994, the threefold increase in housing 
loans from December 1991 to December 1994 is a lower bound estimate. The actual rate of 
growth might have been nearly twice that.
16  
Notably, the rapid growth in lending was not matched by an equally rapid growth in 
deposits. In 1993, 1994, and 1995 loans outstripped deposits by roughly 20 percent: the 
difference was funded through inter-bank lending, predominantly from foreign banks in 
foreign currency.  (Mackey 1999: 60, 98). Foreign denominated liabilities therefore grew 
rapidly, from 11 percent of total Mexican bank liabilities in December 1991 to 14.7 percent in 
December 1993, to 27 percent in December 1994. As Mishkin (1996) has pointed out, the 
practice of Mexican banks of matching these foreign denominated liabilities with foreign 
                                                 
16 The Comision Nacional Bancaria y de Valores, the regulator, did not ask banks to report non-
performing loans in a disaggregated fashion in the early 1990s, thus we do not know the composition of the non-
performing loan portfolio.   50 
denominated assets (loans made to Mexican firms in dollars) did not reduce the bank’s 
exchange rate risk.  Unless the borrowing firms had sources of income in dollars, they would 
have had great difficulty in servicing their debts in the event of devaluation.  In point of fact, 
the borrowers tended not to have sources of income in dollars (Krueger and Tornell 1999).  
Even more rapid than the growth in lending, was the growth of non-performing loans.  
Table 3 presents estimates of non-performing loans based on different ways of treating the 
various rollovers and restructurings that were permitted under Mexican accounting rules. One 
way that banks handled past due principal was to ―rediscount‖ them—essentially creating a 
category of rollovers that reflected the low probability that the loans would be repaid.   These 
rediscounts were not listed in the portfolio of performing loans, but they were not listed as 
being non-performing either.  If we add these rediscounts to declared non-performing loans, 
then the default rate jumps dramatically.  For example, instead of being 3.6 percent in 
December 1991, (the declared ratio of non-performing to total loans) the ratio would have 
13.5 percent.  Instead of being 6.1 percent in December 1994 (the declared rate) it would have 
been 17.1 percent.  The practice of ―rediscounting‖ loans began to be phased out by banks in 
1995.  Instead, they began to renew or restructure unpaid principal, and treated these rollovers 
as performing. Treating these rollovers as past due loans produces even more striking results.  
Instead of a non-performing ratio of 5.7 percent in December 1996, the ratio jumps to 32.5 
percent.   
Even this figure is likely an underestimate, because beginning in February 1995 banks 
were allowed to swap many of their loans for promissory notes from Mexico’s deposit 
insurance system as part of a bailout (a subject to which we will return at length).  If we add 
the value of these promissory notes to the value of declared non-performing loans,   51 
rediscounts, and restructured or renewed loans, then the percentage of loans that were non-
performing actually exceeded the percentage of loans that were in good standing: in 
December 1996 the non-performance ratio would have been 52.6 percent.   
 
Collapse and Bailout     
Even had there been no peso crisis of 1994-95, the Mexican banking system would 
have collapsed.  The government’s mishandling of the exchange rate merely hastened the 
banking system’s demise. The crawling peg exchange rate policy of the Salinas government 
had been established to help fight inflation, and it had been largely successful in 
accomplishing that goal. Given the fact that Mexican interest rates were considerably higher 
than U.S. rates, and that the government was signaling an intention to maintain a stable 
exchange rate, there were strong incentives for both Mexicans and foreigners to deposit funds 
in Mexican banks.  There were also incentives for Mexican firms, including banks, to sign 
debt contracts denominated in dollars.  By the end of 1994, however, it was becoming 
increasingly clear that the exchange rate was overvalued.  Once that happened, bank 
depositors had every incentive to withdraw their funds and convert them to dollars before the 
government allowed the currency to float freely.  Firms with dollar denominated debts could 
not, however, act so quickly: as a result, the peso value of their debts nearly doubled in the 
space of a few days once the exchange rate was allowed to float.    
The collapse of the exchange rate created two problems for the banking system. First, 
foreign currency loans represented roughly one-third of total loans made by Mexican banks.  
Many of these loans, however, had been made to firms without sources of foreign currency 
income. (Krueger and Tornell, 1999).  Second, the collapse of the peso gave foreign portfolio 
investors strong incentives to pull their funds out of Mexico. Net foreign portfolio investment   52 
flows turned negative  in the last quarter of 1994, and stayed there all through 1995. (Mishkin 
1996:31).  This required that the government pursue a tight monetary policy, raising central 
bank interest rates. The interbank loan rate, at its peak, hit 114 percent. Mortgage interest 
rates jumped to 74 percent by March 1995, from 22 percent just five months before. (Gruben 
and McComb 1997). The rapid rise in interest rates pushed risky, but performing, loans into 
default.  As the stock of non-performing loans mounted, and as the size of the deposit base 
shrank because of the run on the peso, the banks became insolvent. 
The dimensions of the collapse can be seen through several measures of bank 
performance.  In Table 3 we estimate the ratio of non-performing to total loans.  If we include 
principal rollovers and the value of FOBAPRA promissory notes as non-performing, then the 
ratio of non-performing loans grew from 17 percent at the end of 1994 to 36 percent by the 
end of 1995, and to 53 percent at the end of 1996. As debtors stopped making payments, 
income from loans dropped precipitously.  Net interest margins (the spread between what 
banks charge for loans and what they pay depositors) actually became negative from 
December 1995 to September 1997 (Haber 2005). 
 
The Unlimited Liability of the Mexican Government  
  The collapse of the credit system sent the economy into a tailspin.  Precisely because 
it had created such a generous safety net in order to induce bankers, shareholders, and 
depositors into the game, it was now the government’s responsibility to fix things: to rescue 
debtors ruined by the rise in interest rates and depositors whose savings had been lost through 
recklessness, and to restore the operation of the financial system, lest the economy go into 
complete free fall.    53 
The government therefore responded with a bailout of the banking system—the 
particulars of which warrant some discussion.  First, Mexican banks had significant amounts 
of short term, dollar denominated debt. The government therefore opened a special dollar 
credit window at the Banco de México to provide them with foreign currency.   
Second, the government sought to prop up the banks by lending them the capital 
necessary to maintain adequate reserves.   A trust fund was created (known as PROCAPTE) 
by the government’s bank deposit insurance agency (FOBAPROA) with funds provided by 
the central bank.  This trust fund lent the banks capital sufficient to maintain a 9 percent 
capital ratio in exchange for five-year subordinated debentures from the bank.  In the event of 
non-payment, the debentures were convertible to ordinary stock that could be sold by the 
government.
17  Banks were enjoined, during the period that they participated in PROCAPTE, 
from issuing dividends or from issuing additional debt instruments to capitalize the bank. 
(Mackey 1999: 65).  
Third, the government moved to protect borrowers, and in so doing protected the 
banks.   There were several debtor protection programs, and as time went on the extent and 
terms of these programs became gradually more lenient.   As a first step, the government 
created an indexed accounting unit (the UDIS) and allowed loans to be re-denominated in 
these units. Banks were then allowed to transfer loans to a government trust fund, which 
converted them to UDIS and which bore a real interest rate of four percent plus a margin to 
reflect the credit risk of the borrower.  A series of additional programs soon followed, each of 
which was targeted at different groups of debtors (including consumers, the holders of home 
                                                 
17 In the event of non-payment, however, the shares likely would not have had much 
value.  
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mortgages, small businesses, and agriculture) and each of which was reformed over time to 
offer debtors even larger discounts off of their payments. (Mackey 1999: 82-86).  
Fourth, the government cleaned the bank’s balance sheets of non-performing loans 
through a loan repurchase program run by FOBAPROA.   In exchange for their non-
performing assets, the banks received a non-tradable, zero coupon ten-year FOBAPROA 
promissory note that carried an interest rate slightly below the government CETES (Treasury 
bond) rate.  The bankers agreed that for each peso in FOBAPROA bonds they received, they 
would inject 50 centavos of new capital, so as to recapitalize the bank.  Banks were charged 
with collecting the principal and interest on the loans transferred to FOBAPROA.  As a 
practical matter, however, they did not do so.  (Krueger and Tornell, 1999; Murillo 2005).   
Banks that were in serious financial distress were intervened by the government’s 
National Banking and Securities Commission (known by its Spanish acronym, CNBV). When 
a bank was intervened, the CNBV seized control of the bank and suspended shareholder 
rights.  It then replaced the management of the banks and appointed a managing intervener.  
The CNBV intervener cleaned the non-performing loans from the balance sheet through the 
FOBAPROA bond mechanism discussed above and injected new capital through the 
PROCAPTE program.  The government, via FOBAPROA, also guaranteed all of the deposits 
of the bank. Finally, the CNBV arranged for the bank to be sold to another institution, or it 
liquidated the bank. In some cases, the CNBV carried out a de facto intervention: in which it 
removed the bank’s management and then arranged for another financial institution to invest 
in or acquire control of the bank.  In all, 12 banks were formally intervened, with another 
three undergoing de facto intervention. That is, 15 of Mexico’s 18 banks were intervened by 
the government.      55 
Moral Hazard 
The government’s intervention and bailout appears to have given some bankers the 
incentive to make large loans to themselves—and then default on the loans.
18 As La Porta et. 
al. (2003) have shown, 20 percent of all large loans from 1995 to 1998 went to bank directors.  
These insider loans carried lower rates of interest than arm’s length loans (by four percentage 
points), had a 33 percent higher probability of default, and had a 30 percent lower collateral 
recovery rate.   
The looting of the banks by their own directors was, in fact, made possible by a 
revision of the rules governing the FOBAPROA loan repurchase program. When the program 
was first instituted in 1995, the following types of loans were ineligible for repurchase by 
FOBAPROA: past due loans; loans held by companies in bankruptcy; loans discounted with 
development banks; loans denominated in UDIS, and loans to related parties (loans to 
directors, their families, or their firms).  As the situation of the banking system continued to 
deteriorate, however, the Technical Committee of FOBAPROA dropped these restrictions. 
(Mackey 1999: 70).   
Moreover, there were no general guidelines regarding limitations and restrictions on 
the whole range of FOBAPROA programs. Not surprisingly, the FOBAPROA bailout was not 
(as originally anticipated in early 1995) a one-time event.  Rather, it became an open-ended 
                                                 
18 Mexico’s bankers had been engaged in related lending for over 100 years before the 
failed related loans of 1995-98.  Related lending during this earlier period was a rational 
response to the difficulty of enforcing contract rights through the legal system and did not 
result in the bankers looting their own banks.  First, bank directors monitored one another 
through complex networks of interlocking directorates.  Second, shareholders developed 
mechanisms to monitor directors.  Third, because there was no deposit insurance, depositors 
policed banks by withdrawing deposits from risky banks.  (Maurer 2002; Del Angel Mobarak 
Mobarak, 2002; Maurer and Haber 2007).   
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mechanism, with loans being transferred from the banks to FOBAPROA through 1999.  Thus, 
the percentage of bank loan portfolios composed of FOBAPROA bonds grew from 9 percent 
in 1995, to 20 percent in 1996, 29 percent in 1997 and 1998, and finally topped out at 35 
percent in 1999.  (See Table 3).  For the same reason, bank interventions were also not a one-
time event, but were spread out from 1994 to 2001. As of June 1999, the total cost of the 
bailout programs was 692 billion pesos ($65 billion) roughly 15 percent of Mexican GNP. 
(Murillo, 2005).    
The fact that the banking system bailout involved an implicit transfer from taxpayers 
to bank stockholders, who included some of Mexico’s wealthiest men, produced a political 
firestorm in Mexico. It fueled the expansion of a national debtors’ protest movement (the 
most prominent manifestation of which was an organization known as ―El Barzón,‖ named 
for the yoke ring to which an ox-drawn plow is attached), and, in the run-up to the 1997 
midterm congressional elections, it contributed to the expansion of opposition political 
parties, which capitalized on the fact that millions of small businesses and middle-class 
debtors were pushed into bankruptcy as a result of sharply increased interest rates and the 
collapse of the banking system.  Newly empowered congressional representatives from 
opposition parties subsequently insisted on an investigation into the mechanisms that had 
been used to rescue commercial banks before they would approve any further bailouts, a 
maneuver that held up approval of the 1999 federal budget for a full 9 months. Ultimately, 
Congress agreed to disband FOBAPROA and replace it with a new (more autonomous) 
deposit guarantee agency, the Bank Savings Protection Institute (known by its Mexican 
acronym, IPAB). Most (although not all) FOBAPROA bonds were swapped for IPAB bonds, 
and IPAB was given the task of recouping and liquidating the assets backed by those bonds.    57 
This was a de facto admission that the loans that had been swapped for FOBAPROA 
promissory notes were unrecoverable.   Congress also agreed that the annual cost of the 
banking sector rescue would be paid for by the government out of each year’s budget. 
(McQuerry 1999). This was a de facto admission that the new IPAB bonds had the status of 
sovereign debt.  
 
How Unusual is Mexico’s History of Banking Instability? 
Readers may be wondering whether Mexico’s history of a banking crisis induced by a 
government expropriation followed by a banking crisis induced by a mismanaged 
privatization is unusual, when viewed from the perspective of the experiences of other 
countries.  Let us leave aside the particulars about expropriations and failed privatizations, 
and set the bar lower by simply asking how many countries around the world had back-to-
back banking crises, one in the 1980s, and another in the 1990s.   
In order to do so, we draw upon the database on banking crises and their resolution, 
constructed by Laeven and Valencia (2010).  We integrate this database with the World 
Bank’s Financial Structure Database (November 2010 update), in order to be able to compare 
crisis and non-crisis countries.  We exclude countries that are or were communist (because it 
is not clear what it means to have a banking system when there are no prices or interest rates), 
as well as countries that are not sovereign, or that do not provide any information about their 
banking systems to the World Bank.  This leaves us with 144 countries. 
Only 14 of those 144 countries, roughly ten percent, had back-to-back banking crises 
in the 1980s and 1990s.  Moreover, the group of multiple crisis countries is far from a random 
draw; it includes some of the worst governed countries on the planet.  The group includes 
Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Kenya, the Philippines,   58 
Morocco, Bolivia, Argentina, Ecuador, Colombia, Costa Rica, and, of course, Mexico. In 
short, the answer to the question, is Mexico’s pre-1997 experience unusual, is an unequivocal 
yes.  
 
The Search for New Partners 
Saving the Mexican banking system not only required a taxpayer-funded bailout, it 
required that the government of President Ernesto Zedillo find a way to put the banking 
system on sounder footings.  That is, the government had to find a new set of bankers with 
which to partner. The question was, what rules would align the incentives of the partners? 
The Zedillo government took a two-pronged approach. First, it revamped the 
regulatory and monitoring system. Second, it recruited new partners by letting foreign banks 
take over a large share of the Mexican market. 
The Zedillo government undertook five reforms designed to improve monitoring and 
recapitalize commercial banks.  First, it made insider lending more difficult to carry out. 
Banks were required to publish consolidated accounts that included the operations of their 
subsidiaries. Banks were also precluded from making loans to bank officers and employees 
that were not part of their employee benefits. Related party loans were allowed, but they could 
not exceed the net capital of the bank.
19   
Second, banks were required to diversify risk.  As of June 1998, bank loans to any 
individual could not exceed ten percent of the bank’s net capital, or 0.5 percent of the total net 
capital of all banks.  The same law also enjoined banks from granting loans to companies that 
                                                 
19 Prior to 1995 related party loans could not exceed 20 percent of the total portfolio of 
the institution.  Related party loans often exceeded even this extremely permissive limit. 
(Mackey 1999: 141).   59 
exceeded 30 percent of the bank’s net capital, or six percent of the total net capital of all 
banks.  
Third, the government increased capital requirements and introduced a regulatory 
system that established reserve minimums in accordance with the risk of a bank’s portfolio. In 
particular, banks were required to access the credit record of borrowers (by using a credit 
bureau).  Loans in which the credit records were not checked (or in which they were checked, 
but they were poor) had to be provisioned at 100 percent. (Mackey 1999: 117).   
Fourth, as of January 1, 1997 new accounting standards, which more closely 
approximate generally accepted accounting standards, went into effect.  For example, the 
accounting treatment of past-due loans was reformed to bring it into line with generally 
accepted standards.  In addition, repurchase agreements were no longer treated as assets, and 
inter-bank loans had to be separately grouped in financial statements. (Del Angel Mobarak, 
Haber, and Musacchio, 2006).  Mexican banks still did not, however, adhere to all features of 
generally accepted accounting standards. In particular, banks were still allowed to record 
deferred taxes as Tier I capital. That may have overstated the quantity and quality of the 
capital available to the banks. (Mackey 1999: 127-29).
20 
 Finally, the rules governing deposit insurance were reformed.  Unlike its predecessor 
(FOBAPROA), IPAB does not provide unlimited insurance.  As of January 1, 2005, insurance 
is limited to 400,000 UDIS (roughly $100,000 at the current rate of exchange) and covers 
bank deposits only, instead of a broad range of bank liabilities.  
                                                 
20 For a detailed discussion of bank accounting changes in Mexico see Del Angel 
Mobarak, Haber and Musacchio (2006).    60 
The second part of the process to redesign the Bank Partnership included the search 
for new partners. For that purpose, the Mexican government lifted the restrictions on foreign 
ownership of commercial banks. The government began to remove restrictions on foreign 
bank acquisitions of Mexican banks in February 1995, when foreign banks were permitted to 
purchase Mexican banks with market shares of six percent or less. This still kept the largest 
Mexican banks off the table.  In 1996, all restrictions were removed on foreign bank 
ownership in Mexico (with the new regulations going into effect in 1997).  As a result, 
foreign banks began to purchase controlling interests in Mexico’s largest banks.  In December 
1996, just prior to the new rules regarding foreign ownership, foreign banks controlled only 
seven percent of total bank assets in Mexico.  Roughly one-half of these foreign-controlled 
assets were in freestanding small banking operations that did actually do much in the way of 
retail banking. By December 1999, 20 percent of bank assets were controlled by foreign 
banks, and as of December 2003 the share of Mexican bank assets under foreign control 
increased to 82 percent. (See Table 1 and Figure 1).  
The stabilization of the Mexican banking system via foreign entry can be seen in 
Tables 5 and 6, which present data on the ratio of (non-risk weighted) capital to assets  and 
the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans.  As Table 5 shows, the equity ratio increased 
steadily, from 9 percent at the end of 1997 to 13 percent by the end of 2006.  The biggest 
increases came in the Foreign MA banks, where the equity ratio jumped from only four 
percent in 1997 to 14 percent by 2007.  The implication is straightforward: when Mexican 
banks were initially purchased by foreign banks they were seriously under-capitalized, and 
their purchase by foreign banks succeeded in recapitalizing them.  At the same time, the ratio 
of non-performing to total loans fell dramatically, from 11 percent in 1997 to two percent by   61 
2005. (See Table 6).  The biggest decline came in domestic banks, where the ratio was 12 
percent in 1997, and 1 percent in 2004.  Driving this decline was the purchase of domestic 
banks by foreign banks (after purchase, banks that were previously coded as domestic are now 
coded as Foreign MA in Table 6, hence their NPL ratios move inversely to one another from 
1997 to 2002).  That is to say, the data suggest that foreign banks purchased the domestic 
banks with the weakest loan portfolios, and then cleaned up those portfolios—a finding that 
we confirm in the next section through econometric analysis.
21 
The evidence also indicates that the entry of foreign banks was coterminous with the 
return of the Mexican banking system to profitability. As Table 7 shows, returns on both 
equity and assets have climbed steadily since 1997, so much so that the 2008-09 banking 
crisis that affected the developed world—most especially Mexico’s northern neighbor—does 
not appear to have had a major effect on the stability of the banking system.  Rates of return 
on assets and equity fell from 2007 to 2008, but Mexico’s banks, regardless of their 
ownership status, continued to post positive returns on equity.  
                                                 
21 One might normally be concerned about the fall-back in equity ratios that appears to 
have occurred after 2006 (See Table 5). The data on non-performing loans (Table 6), 
however, indicate that by 2006 banks no longer had to provision heavily against loan-losses.  
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Section Five 
Did Foreign Bank Entry Improve Social Welfare in Mexico? 
Now that we understand the facts related to the government’s decision to allow foreign 
banks to purchase Mexico’s largest banks, as well as open the market to foreign entry more 
broadly, we are in a position to draw on the financial economics literature in order to design 
an econometric strategy to estimate the effect of foreign entry on the behavior and 
performance of Mexico’s banking system.  
Making a causal statement about the impact of foreign entry on the volume, price, or 
volatility of credit requires the researcher to first ask, ―raise (or lower) the volume, pricing, 
and volatility of credit, as compared to what?‖  Simply stated, we cannot compare the 
Mexican banking industry in 2012 to the Mexican banking industry that would have existed in 
2012 in the absence of liberalization, because that hypothetical Mexican banking industry 
does not exist.   
We also cannot compare the Mexican banking industry in 2012 against the banking 
industry of another country (or group of countries) that was just like Mexico prior to 1997, but 
that then did not liberalize the rules governing the entry of foreign banks.  As the previous 
section makes clear, Mexico’s expropriation of the banks in 1982, the failed bank 
privatization of 1991-92, and the banking crisis of 1995-95, were singular events. An 
appropriate counterfactual case would not just need to have had Mexico’s level and 
distribution of income, as well as a pre-1997 banking system that closely mirrored that of 
Mexico in terms of its structure and institutions, it would also need to have experienced a 
banking crisis similar to that of Mexico in the mid-1990s, but then did not respond to that   63 
crisis by opening up to foreign entry.  The popular aphorism, ―Como México, no hay dos‖ 
actually has deep analytic meaning.  
Making matters more complicated still, the laws governing foreign entry were only 
one of a series of changes that occurred in Mexico after 1997.  Some of those changes 
affected the banking industry narrowly.  For example, between 1997 and 2001, the 
government changed the accounting rules and standards for bank financial statements, made it 
more difficult for banks to make related-party loans, increased the statutory limits on deposit 
insurance, increased requirements governing provisions for loan losses, and changed the legal 
basis of mortgage contracts in order to make them easier to enforce.  Other changes were 
much broader in character, not the least of which was that Mexico democratized, and as a 
result the government became much more active in supporting private lending in the housing 
market through the Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal.  In and of themselves, without foreign 
entry, these changes would have affected the behavior and performance of Mexico’s banks. 
Hence, we cannot simply compare Mexico’s pre-1997 banking system to its post-1997 
banking system and infer that any observed differences were caused by foreign entry.  Doing 
so would imply the specification of a hypothetical Mexico in which there had not been a 
disastrous bank privatization, a taxpayer-financed rescue, and a subsequent demand by 
citizens that the rules governing the banking system, as well as the rules governing the 
political system, be reformed.  
Making matters even more complicated, the liberalization of Mexico’s banking laws 
did not just lead to a one-time of wave of foreign entry or an immediate change in bank 
behavior.  The effects of foreign entry were felt gradually and affected Mexican banks 
asymmetrically.  Banks changed their behavior when they were acquired by foreign banks,   64 
but they were not acquired at the same time.  Moreover, non-acquired banks, those that 
remained domestically owned, subsequently faced a different competitive environment, and 
had to respond by changing their own behavior.  These changes included mergers with other 
domestically-owned banks.    In short, any reasonable identification strategy has to be able to 
capture changes within the banking system as a whole, as well as changes within types of 
banks within that system.  
Finally, we need to take account of the fact that the decision to open up Mexico’s 
banking industry to foreign competition, as well as the decisions made by foreign banks to 
purchase specific Mexican banks, were not made randomly.  The Mexican government 
changed the rules governing foreign entry in order to recapitalize an insolvent banking 
industry, one that had to be rescued from a disastrous privatization program.  It might have 
been the case, therefore, that the Mexican government permitted foreign banks to purchase the 
Mexican banks that were the most distressed.  Though researchers often draw simple 
comparisons between the behavior and performance of foreign-owned and Mexican-owned 
banks, doing so comes at the risk of drawing spurious inferences.  Simply put, it is not 
reasonable to assume that had Mexico’s largest banks remained in the hands of domestic 
owners, they would have behaved the same way—in terms of the volume of credit they 
offered, the price at which they offered it, and the distribution of that credit across different 
loan types—as the smaller banks that remained in the hands of domestic owners. They may 
well have been sold to foreign owners because that was the only way that the government 
could be sure that the banks would be properly recapitalized.  
Providing a meaningful answer to the question of whether foreign bank entry raised or 
lowered welfare in Mexico therefore requires us to exploit two sources of variance. The first   65 
is variance within the banks that were purchased by foreign banks, controlling for changes 
that occurred among all banks.  That is, we compare banks against themselves before and 
after they were bought. We do so by building a unique bank-level dataset covering the 54 
quarters between mid-1997 and the end of 2011.  We then control for unobservables, and the 
non-random distribution of bank types, by using bank fixed effects.  Because Mexico’s banks 
were bought at different times, and because we can control for the changes that affected all 
banks, we are able to draw inferences about the independent impact of being purchased by a 
foreign bank.  The second is variance between foreign banks of various types, controlling for 
changes that occurred among all banks.  That is, we compare the banks that were purchased 
by foreign banks to foreign banks that were set up as greenfield operations.    
 
Data 
In order to examine the effects of foreign bank entry into Mexico we use a database of 
bank financials that includes balance sheets, income statements, and loan portfolios on a 
quarterly basis for every retail bank in Mexico from September 1997 to December 2011, 
obtained either from the website of Mexico’s Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores 
(CNBV) or directly from the printed quarterly bulletins of CNBV (Boletín Estadístico de 
Banca Múltiple).
22  
The key to our identification strategy is to identify those banks that had been subject to 
mergers and acquisitions (both by other domestic banks and by foreign banks). We do this by 
                                                 
22 WWW.CNBV.gob.mx.   Readers who may wish to replicate or extend our results 
should be cautioned not to rely on the website alone, because the CNBV deletes historical 
data for banks that later merged with other banks or otherwise exited the market.  Simply 
downloading the data from the CNBV website will produce a truncated sample of surviving, 
merged banks. We also had to fix the 1997 data, as well as the 2007-2011, which was 
reported in cumulative form—each quarter adding the previous quarters.   66 
tracking the bank charters and charter reforms as compiled by Mexico’s Comisión Nacional 
para la Protección y Defensa de los Usuarios de Servicios Financieros (CONDUSEF), from 
2003 to 2010. With this we end up having a dataset that allows us to follow banks over time, 
regardless of changes in name or ownership.
23  Then, for each quarter, we code banks as 
Domestic, Foreign MA (for Mexican banks that were the product of a foreign acquisition), or 
Foreign de Novo, if they are a foreign greenfield bank or a foreign bank that acquired a 
foreign bank that was already operating in Mexico.
24  Table 8 identifies the banks in our 
database and shows how they were coded.  
As we mentioned before, the liberalization in the banking system in 1997 did not 
cause a switch of ownership of Mexican banks right away. Thus, our study is not a before and 
after 1997 study. In fact, we purposely do not include observations before September 1997 
because in order to prevent a reoccurrence of the 1995-96 banking crisis, the government 
reformed bank accounting standards in 1997.  This means that it is not possible to link data 
from before September 1997 with data from after September 1997 (Del Angel Mobarak, 
Haber, and Musacchio 2006).  
Nevertheless, our data set captures the period in which the greatest changes in 
Mexican bank ownership occurred.  At the beginning of the period under study (September 
                                                 
23  The URL for this site has changed over time. Its current location is:  
http://sipres.condusef.gob.mx/home/SQLsectoresSHCP.asp?ID=40. 
 
24 Foreign MA was coded as 1 if a foreign bank purchased a controlling interest in a 
domestic Mexican bank. This means that the Mexican bank continues to exist as a reporting 
unit, although its name is sometimes altered to reflect the change in ownership.  For example, 
when the Banco de Bilbao y Vizcaya purchased a controlling interest in Bancomer, the 
merged bank was renamed BBV Bancomer. Some foreign banks even bought two Mexican 
banks. For instance, Santander is coded as Foreign MA from the beginning of the database 
because it purchased Banco Mexicano. When Santander purchases Serfin, however, we code 
Serfin and its subsequent observations as Foreign MA. In short, the idea of our Foreign MA 
code is to track Mexican banks right after they switch to being foreign.   67 
1997), the vast majority of the foreign banks in Mexico were extremely small operations. In 
point of fact, in September, 1997 there was only one Foreign MA bank operating in Mexico 
(the Banco de Santander, which had acquired a small Mexican bank in 1993), with a 7.7 
percent market share.  Fifteen foreign de novo banks accounted for an additional 8.3 percent 
of the loan market. By late 2007 there were six Foreign MA banks operating in Mexico 
(Banamex, BBVA Bancomer, Santander Serfin, GE Capital Bank, Bital, and Scotiabank 
Inverlat) with a combined loan market share of 74.2 percent. This share then declined to 65% 
by the end of 2011. Between 2004 and 2011, Foreign de Novo banks accounted for an 
additional 1.8 percent of the loan market.  In short, the total foreign market share, as measured 
by loan volume, mushroomed from 16 percent in September 1997 to 67 percent by December 
2011.   
 
Methods 
We study the impact of foreign entry on a series of variables. In order to do so, we 
follow the approach of Martínez Peria and Mody (2004), who study interest rate spreads in 
foreign banks in Latin America.
25  We mimic their baseline model, but add bank fixed effects 
and then add controls for the characteristics of loan portfolios. Their approach was strictly to 
compare foreign and domestic bank net interest margins in a cross-section, while our 
identification strategy is to compare Mexican banks before and after they turned foreign, 
controlling for the behavior of all other banks as well as for common shocks that affect all 
banks. Thus, we employ the following specification with and without bank fixed effects:  
                                                 
25 Their framework draws on two bodies of literature:  the dealership model of bank 
spreads developed by Ho and Saunders (1981), Allen (1988),  Angbazo (1997), and Brock 
and Rojas Suarez (2000); and the firm-theoretic model of bank spreads developed by Zarruck 
(1989) and Wong (1997)   68 
NIM i, t = α0 + α1 Liquidity i t + α2 Admin Costs i, t + α3 NPL i t + α4 Equity i t  + α5 Bank 
Market Share i t + α6 Foreign MA t + α7 Foreign MA t  x linear trend + α8 Foreign De Novo  t 
+ α9 Foreign De Novo  t x linear trend + α10  Housing Loans i t + α11 Commercial Loans i t + 
α12  Consumer Loans i t +α13  Fobaproa-IPAB i t + α14 Bank i, + α15  Quarter dummy t, + ei t    (1) 
 
where i is the bank id and t refers to the time period considered.  NIM, the net interest margin, 
or loan spread,  is calculated as interest on loans over total loans minus interest paid to 
depositors over total deposits. Equity is the ratio of a bank’s equity to its assets.  In theory, 
higher equity ratios should discourage risky lending, because more stockholder wealth is at 
risk.  Liquidity is the ratio of cash (including deposits in other banks or in the central bank) to 
assets, Admin Costs is the ratio of administrative costs to total assets, and NPL is the ratio of 
non-performing loans to total loans. Bank Market Share is the proportion of each bank’s loans 
to total system loans. We employ robust standard errors. 
Our variables of interest are Foreign MA, which is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 at each point in time that a bank is owned by a foreign bank and Foreign De Novo, 
which is a variable that takes a value of 1 at each point in time that a bank is a foreign-owned 
greenfield operation.
26 These allow us to compare Foreign MA and De Novo banks to 
domestic banks. Including them separately permits us to draw inferences about behavior that 
is linked to foreignness per se: if the coefficients for these variables have the same sign and 
significance, it implies that foreign owners take a different approach to the Mexican market 
than domestic banks; if the coefficients are of different sign and significance, it implies that 
                                                 
26 We do not add additional controls for mergers and acquisitions among domestic 
banks because there is not enough variation to make it worthwhile.   69 
the differences between these bank types and domestic banks is driven by some unobserved 
characteristic other than their foreignness. We also interact each of these variables with a time 
trend to see if the behavior of foreign banks changes over time.  
Our models also control for the characteristics of bank loan portfolios by including the 
percentage of housing, commercial, and consumer loans to assets. Additionally, we control 
for the fact banks held FOBAPROA-IPAB bonds, by including the ratio of those bonds to 
total assets in each bank (FOBAPROA-IPAB).  We also included controls for bank nationality 
in some specification to see if Foreign MA banks behave differently from Foreign De Novo 
banks due to nationality, rather than for simply being foreign. We do not include them here 
because nationality of the banks that acquired Mexican banks is not driving our results. 
The Mexican banks that were acquired by foreign banks tended to be large, 
undercapitalized, and distressed—which is precisely why the Mexican government allowed 
them to be purchased by foreigners in the first place—and these characteristics may be 
correlated with performance outcomes.  Our specifications control for this potential problem 
by including variables for the equity ratio, liquidity ratio, composition of the loan portfolio, 
and the ratio of a assets composed of bailout bonds (FOBAPROA and IPAB) to all other 
assets.  In order to control for serial correlation we cluster the (robust) standard errors by 
bank. 
Table 9, which presents summary statistics, suggests that there may be differences in 
the behavior and performance of Foreign MA banks and domestic banks.  Foreign MA banks 
appear to charge lower net interest margins, earn higher rates of return on assets and equity, 
and participate more aggressively in the market for mortgage loans, while being less involved 
in the commercial lending market.  Foreign de Novo banks do not appear to mirror the   70 
behavior or performance of Foreign MA banks, but neither do they mirror the behavior and 
performance of domestically-owned banks.  The data suggest, in short, that these three types 
of banks may operate in different segments of the credit market.    71 
Section Six  
 
Econometric Results 
We divide our econometric tests into three broad categories. First we look at the 
effects of foreign bank entry on the pricing of loans using our net interest margin (NIM) 
regressions. Second, we look at the effects of foreign bank entry on the stability of the system 
by looking at the riskiness of bank loan portfolios (as measured by the proportion of non-
performing loans to total loans).  Finally, we study the effects of foreign bank entry on the 
volume of credit made available to the private sector. 
 
Effects of Foreign Bank Entry on the Pricing of Credit  
Has the entry of foreign banks in Mexico caused net interest margins to increase or 
decrease?  Table 10 presents the results of the regressions on net interest margins that we 
specified in Section IV.  Specification 1 is estimated with random effects and includes quarter 
dummies, and is therefore primarily picking up differences in means between different bank 
types. It suggests that, once the composition and risk of loan portfolios, administrative costs, 
equity ratios, liquidity ratios, and common shocks affecting all banks are controlled for, there 
is no difference between the net interest margins charged by Foreign MA banks and the net 
interest margins charged by domestic banks. Foreign de Novo banks charge net interest 
margins that almost 2 percentage points lower than domestic banks.  Given that the sample 
mean is only 0.029, these results are not just statistically significant they are economically 
significant. The regression also suggests that there is no difference between Foreign MA 
banks, Foreign de Novo banks, and domestically owned banks in the movement of net interest 
margins over time (the time trend, as well as the interaction of the time trend with Foreign 
MA and Foreign de Novo, are either perfectly estimated at zero or are not statistically   72 
significant). This suggests that domestic banks are not closing the gap between what they 
charge and what foreign banks charge. 
Because the time trend and its interactions with bank ownership types did not pick 
anything up, and they may be coming at a cost to the model, we re-estimate the regression in 
Specification 2 dropping the trends and interactions.  The coefficient on the Foreign de Novo 
dummy continues to be statistically and economically significant.  The coefficient on Foreign 
MA is negative (they charge lower net interest margins than domestically owned banks), but it 
is not statistically significant at conventional levels.    
Specification 3 of Table 10 is estimated using bank fixed effects. The coefficient on 
Foreign MA is now picking up the impact on interest margins of a domestic bank being 
acquired by a foreign bank. It suggests that, once the composition and risk of loan portfolios, 
administrative costs, equity ratios, liquidity ratios, common shocks affecting all banks, and 
the behavior of other banks are controlled for, being purchased by a foreign bank has no effect 
on net interest margins. In short, there is no evidence that foreign entry has reduced welfare 
by increasing the price of credit, while there is some evidence that it has increased welfare.  
 
Effects of Foreign Bank Entry on System Stability  
Wong (1997) develops a theoretical model about net interest margins that suggests 
that when a bank charges lower margins it does so either because its loan portfolio is less 
risky or because it is risk-loving. The detailed nature of our data allows us to evaluate directly 
the hypothesis that there are differences in the risk of loan portfolios across foreign and 
domestic banks in Mexico. We can simply employ the regression framework above, but 
substitute the ratio of non-performing loans for net interest margins.    73 
Table 11 presents the results, and they suggest that foreign banks have less risky loan 
portfolios. Specification 1 of Table 11 estimates the NPL regression using random effects and 
quarterly dummies, and thus primarily picks up differences between bank types.  It indicates 
that, controlling for the distribution of the loan portfolio, equity ratios, liquidity ratios, 
administrative costs, and common shocks affecting all banks, loans made by Foreign MA 
banks are neither less nor more likely to become non-performing than loans made by 
domestically-owned banks.  It also suggests that loans made by Foreign de Novo banks are  
much less likely to become non-performing: the coefficient of -0.071 indicates that, on 
average, their ratio of non-performing loans  is 7 percentage points below that of domestic 
banks. Given that the same mean is only 0.034, this is an economically large effect. 
Specification 2 of Table 11 includes bank fixed effects, and thus the Foreign MA 
variable now picks up the effect of a bank switching from domestic to foreign ownership 
(controlling for the distribution of the loan portfolio, equity ratios, liquidity ratios, 
administrative costs, common shocks affecting all banks, and the behavior of other banks).  
The coefficient of -0.065 suggests that after a domestically-owned bank was acquired by a 
foreign bank, its ratio of non-performing loans fell by 6.5 percentage points. This result is not 
just statistically significant (at the one percent level) it is economically of very large 
magnitude.  In short, the regressions point to a rather sizable decrease in the riskiness of a 
domestic bank’s loan portfolio after it was acquired by a foreign bank.  
These regression results are consistent with interviews we conducted with Mexican 
bankers and industrialists. In their accounts, after acquiring a domestic bank, foreign banks 
tended to centralize credit approval and upgrade the credit scoring system. Previously, 
Mexican banks such as Banamex, Bancomer and Serfin relied on regional credit committees   74 
that included local industrialists with long relationships with the banks. Those industrialists 
provided soft information to the credit committees and regional managers of banks. After 
being acquired by a foreign owner, however, those regional credit committees lost importance 
or disappeared. 
Taken together, Tables 10 and 11 suggest that the domestic banks that were later 
acquired by foreign banks made loans that had a high probability of default, but they did not 
charge net interest margins commensurate with that degree of risk.  Our results are therefore 
broadly consistent with those of La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa (2003), who find 
that between 1995 and 1998, Mexico’s bankers tended to make loans to their own enterprises 
at low rates of interest and inadequate collateral, and then defaulted on those loans. Our 
results may explain why, after they were intervened, the Mexican government did not sell 
them back to domestic owners. 
 
Effects of Foreign Bank Entry on Credit Provision  
Finally, we look at the effect on foreign entry into the volume of credit going to the 
private sector, where private sector lending is defined as the sum of credit for housing, 
consumer, and commercial purposes as a percentage of total bank assets.  Our regressions 
include the usual controls from Tables 10 and 11, but also add controls for the net interest 
margins because we assume that the volume of lending is not independent of the interest rates 
charged on loans.  The results, presented in specification 1 of Table 12, indicate that once we 
control for changes in bank fundamentals, as well as common shocks affecting all banks, 
Foreign MA banks and Foreign de Novo banks neither lend more nor less than domestic 
banks.     75 
Because the time trend and its interactions with bank ownership types did not pick 
anything up, and they may be coming at a cost to the model, we re-estimate the regression in 
Specification 2 dropping the trends and interactions.  The coefficient on the Foreign de Novo 
dummy continues to be statistically insignificant.  The coefficient on Foreign MA, however, 
is negative, but is not statistically significant at conventional levels.   Nevertheless, it suggests 
(weakly) that Foreign MA banks may allocate less credit than domestic banks.  
Specification 3 adds bank fixed effects, and thus the Foreign MA variable now 
captures the effect of switching ownership from domestic to foreign.  It produces a negative 
coefficient, but it is not statistically significant at conventional levels. It suggests (weakly) 
that when a bank switches from domestic to foreign ownership (controlling for changes in 
bank fundamentals, common shocks affecting all banks, and the behavior of other types of 
banks), it may allocate less credit to the private sector.  
This is not to say that credit growth has been decreasing in Mexico. Indeed, it has been 
increasing: as Table 4 shows, lending to the private sector roughly doubled in real terms 
between 1999 and 2011.  It is to say, however, that the banks that switched ownership from 
domestic to foreign have not increased lending (as a percentage of assets) either compared 
compared to domestic banks or compared to themselves before they were sold.  
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Section Seven 
Conclusions 
By the standards of other upper-middle income countries, Mexico has an 
extraordinarily small banking system.  As Figure 3 shows, in 2009 commercial bank credit to 
firms and households in Mexico only amounted to 22 percent of GDP. This was more than 
one standard deviation below the mean for other countries in this income category, putting 
Mexico near the bottom of the distribution, along with countries such as Botswana, Algeria, 
the Dominican Republic, Peru, and Argentina.  It is also the case that, by any standard, an 
extraordinarily large proportion of the Mexican banking system is foreign owned.   
It is usually not a good idea to confuse correlation with causality, and the Mexican 
banking system is not an exception to this general rule.  With the exception of the brief period 
1991-94, when Mexico’s banks were lending wildly because they had little capital at stake, 
Mexico has historically had a small commercial banking system.  The reasons for the modest 
scale of commercial banking in Mexico, as we have shown in this paper, was the nature of the 
partnership between the Mexican government and Mexico’s bankers.  The tenuous nature of 
this partnership not only gave rise to rather modest levels of credit from commercial banks, it 
also gave rise to an unstable banking system.  Indeed, whatever modest growth occurred from 
the 1920s to the 1960s was squelched by financial repression during the latter half of the 
1970s, when the government chose to finance its deficits via an inflation tax and high deposit 
reserve rates.  The government then expropriated the banking system outright in 1982.  When 
the government attempted to form a new partnership with a group of bankers, during the 
privatization of 1991-92, the nature of the deal that they crafted virtually guaranteed that the   77 
banking system would collapse in short order.  In short, to the degree that one can point to a 
―good old days‖ of Mexican banking, we appear to be in it.   
The post-1997 Mexican banking system has several characteristics that differentiate it 
from the banking system that existed in Mexico for most of the 20
th century.  The system is 
extremely stable, in part, because there is less moral hazard built into the partnership between 
the government and the bankers.  Mexico’s foreign bankers have strong incentives not to 
mismanage their end of the partnership. The capital that they risk is real, not fictitious.  They 
also have weak incentives to tunnel into their own banks, because they do not own 
downstream, non-financial companies. In addition, they are subject to much greater oversight, 
because at the same time that the government opened the market, it reformed accounting 
standards.  They can also not expect to be bailed out by Mexican taxpayers. Should they 
behave imprudently, it is unlikely that they will receive the kind of open-ended guarantees 
that their Mexican counterparts received circa 1995-96. Finally, they are not just accountable 
to Mexican regulators, but are also accountable to dispersed shareholders abroad, as well as 
regulators in their home countries.  In short, they have a lot of lose, and little to gain, from 
being opportunistic partners. 
The partnership between the Mexican government and foreign bankers also gains 
strength from the fact that the Mexican government cannot easily expropriate foreign banks or 
otherwise reduce their property rights.  Foreign bankers in Mexico, especially those from the 
United States and Canada, can access protection against the Mexican government from their 
home governments, as well as from international tribunals under NAFTA. In short, foreign 
bankers have protections against the Mexican government that Mexican bankers do not have.    78 
Finally, the Mexican banking system has become increasingly stable and efficient for 
another reason, one that is independent of the nationalities of the bankers: the Mexican 
government no longer has unlimited authority and discretion, because the parties in control of 
the government now operate under the rules of democracy.  It would be a gross exaggeration 
to say that the rule of law is as strong in Mexico as it is in Sweden, but it would equally 
misguided to state that democratization since 1997 has not strengthened the rule of law.  
Mexico’s bankers, regardless of their national origin, can no longer be expropriated with the 
stroke of a pen.  Moreover, Mexico’s taxpayers made it clear in 1997 that they will can and 
will punish governments that forge partnerships that are likely to fail, and leave them to bear 
the cost of the bank rescue.  Mexico’s ―Game of Bank Bargains‖ has fundamentally changed.     79 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Foreign Banks’ Share of the Mexican Market (as a % of Total Assets) 
 
 
   Foreign M&A 
Foreign de 
Novo  Total Foreign 
1991  0%  1%  1% 
1992  0%  1%  1% 
1993  0%  3%  3% 
1994  0%  4%  4% 
1995  3%  2%  5% 
1996  4%  3%  7% 
1997  7%  4%  11% 
1998  11%  9%  20% 
1999  11%  8%  20% 
2000  55%  2%  57% 
2001  50%  5%  54% 
2002  79%  2%  82% 
2003  79%  3%  82% 
2004  79%  4%  83% 
2005  79%  4%  83% 
2006  77%  5%  82% 
2007  75%  5%  80% 
2008  70%  5%  74% 
2009  70%  4%  74% 
2010  58%  9%  67% 
2011  65%  9%  74% 
Source: Estimated by the authors with data in Mexico. Comision Nacional Bancaria. Banca Multiple. Diciembre 
1982-Diciembre 1993, Mexico: CNB, May 1994, for 1982-1993; Mexico. Comision Nacional Bancaria y de 
Valores (CNBV). Boletin Estadistico de Banca Multiple. Mexico: CNBV, December 1995, for 1992-1995; and,  
Boletin Estadistico de Banca Multiple available on-line at www.cnbv.gob.mx, accessed last on April 28, 2012, 
for 1995–2011. For the coding of Foreign banks see text.  
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Figure 1. Foreign Banks’ Share of the Mexican Market by Type of Bank (as a % of Total Assets) 
 
Source: See Table 1. 
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Figure 2. The Sources of Credit in Mexico as a Percent of GDP, 1925 –1978 
 
Source: INEGI and Del Angel Mobarak (2002). 
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Figure 3
Credit to Firms and Households by Deposit Money Banks, 
as Percent of GDP, Upper Middle Income Countries, 2009
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Table 2. Decomposing Bid to Book Ratios in Mexico's Bank Privatization 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Constant  2.66  6.57  4.95  3.7  4.1 
  (7.32)  (4.65)  (4.02)  (2.74)  (2.30) 
Log of Assets    -0.33  -0.31  -0.3  -0.2 
    (-2.17)  (-2.63)  (-2.42)  (-1.60) 
Bid Round  0.25    0.27  0.3  0.3 
  (2.70)    (3.35)  (3.95)  (3.06) 
Number of 
Bidders      0.17  0.2  0.2 
      (1.44)  (1.93)  (1.55) 
Return on Equity        0.01   
        (1.69)   
Return on Assets          0.1 
          (0.63) 
           
Observations  18  18  18  18  18 
Adjusted R
2  0.27  0.18  0.49  0.55  0.47 
Log likelihood  -17.89  -18.95  -13.38  -11.59  -13.11 
Durbin-Watson  1.37  1.13  1.79  1.44  1.69 
F-statistic  7.29  4.70  6.54  6.27  4.79 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.02  0.05  0.01  0.005  0.01 
Dependent variable is the price paid to book value of the bank. T-statistics are in parentheses. We ran these 
regressions using ordinary least squares. 
Source: Data on assets, bid rounds, and number of bidders from Murillo (2002). Data on return on assets and 
return on equity calculated from data in Mexico, Commision Nacional Bancaria, Banca Multiple, 1982-1993. 
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Table 3.  Reported and Estimated Risk Profile of the Bank Loan Portfolios, 1991-2003 
  
Declared non-
performing 
(NPL) as 
percent of total 
loans 
Declared NPL 
+ rediscounts 
as % of total 
loans 
Declared NPL + 
rediscounts  + 
renewed and 
restructured as % 
of total loans 
FOBAPROA 
or IPAB as % 
of total loans 
Declared NPL + 
rediscounts + 
restructured and 
FOBAPROA-IPAB 
as % of total loans 
1991  3.6%  13.5%  13.5%  0%  13.5% 
1992  4.7%  14.7%  14.7%  0%  14.7% 
1993  6.0%  16.2%  16.2%  0%  16.2% 
1994  6.1%  17.1%  17.1%  0%  17.1% 
1995  6.2%  13.3%  26.8%  9.5%  36.3% 
1996  5.7%  10.8%  32.5%  20.1%  52.6% 
1997  10.2%  10.2%  10.2%  28.9%  39.0% 
1998  10.2%  10.2%  10.2%  29.5%  39.7% 
1999  8.2%  8.2%  8.2%  35.3%  43.5% 
2000  5.5%  5.5%  5.5%  28.9%  34.4% 
2001  4.9%  4.9%  4.9%  27.8%  32.7% 
2002  4.4%  4.4%  4.4%  22.7%  27.1% 
2003  3.2%  3.2%  3.2%  21.0%  24.1% 
Source: Calculated from data in Mexico. Comisión Nacional Bancaria. Banca Múltiple.1982-93, and Mexico. 
Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores, Boletín Estadístico de Banca Múltiple, 1993-2004. 
Note: Reported nonperforming loans (NPL) includes only past due interest until at least 1997.  After 1997 this 
figures include the principal as well. Yet NPLs cleaned as part of the FOBAPROA bailout program are not 
included in this reported figure. Thus, in the last column we estimate total nonperforming loans as the sum of the 
declared NPL, rediscounts, restructured loans, and the total sum of the FOBAPROA bonds. 
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Notes: 
1)  The commercial loan category did not exist before 1997, thus it was estimated as a residual of total loans 
minus consumer, housing, government, restructured and renewed and non-performing loans. 
2) Does not include government bonds, which are held in the securities portfolio. 
3) Value of Fobaproa and IPAB promissory notes held by banks. They are treated as loans, because they 
represent loans transferred to Fobaproa and IPAB. 
4) Rediscounted loans are non-performing loans whose principal was rolled over.  Restructured and Renewed 
represent loans in danger of default.  In 1997, new accounting standards required banks to either declare these as 
non-performing or treat them as performing loans. 
5) Includes Commercial, Consumer, and Housing. 
 
Source: Aggregates created by the authors from the loan portfolios (―Carteras de Credito‖) published in 
Comisión Nacional Bancaria. Banca Multiple, 1982-1993 and Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores. Boletin 
Estadístico de Banca Múltiple, 1993–2011. We deflate the data using the wholesale Price index from the Banco 
de México web page (December 2000=100), available at http://www.banxico.org, accessed May 12, 2012. 
Table 4  
Mexican Bank Lending, By Category (Balances at Year End in Millions of Pesos of Dec 2000)
Year Commercial
1 Consumer Housing Government
2
Fobaproa 
and IPAB
3
Renewed, 
Restructured, or 
Rediscounted
4
Loans to other 
financial 
institutions
Total Private 
Lending
5
1991 776,386               91,312              114,805         112,256               982,503            
1992 961,879               127,757            178,439         148,728               1,268,075        
1993 1,181,744            118,880            248,808         187,766               1,549,432        
1994 1,423,325            109,387            299,437         244,066               1,832,149        
1995 801,937               51,617              192,304         957                   156,237        339,796               1,045,858        
1996 513,686               27,745              80,338            18,587              273,760        364,298               621,769            
1997 405,675               39,415              173,251         88,181              340,212        618,341            
1998 354,414               30,634              150,547         88,647              218,779        15,357             550,952            
1999 276,297               31,665              125,478         89,016              353,099        15,777             449,217            
2000 296,442               38,650              109,178         144,118            364,893        11,973             456,243            
2001 285,394               54,359              111,362         147,899            265,011        16,946             468,061            
2002 294,192               71,372              113,484         186,825            245,804        24,022             503,070            
2003 274,055               99,075              99,591            178,975            240,955        21,918             494,639            
2004 306,640               135,968            99,191            132,354            165,395        34,574             576,373            
2005 325,805               202,868            135,183         147,693            148,334        46,853             710,709            
2006 385,313               273,367            170,112         121,348            38,439         41,392             870,184            
2007 489,207               120,811            327,787         192,427            15,459         59,136             996,941            
2008 402,801               294,814            197,052         100,176            52,823             947,490            
2009 388,043               233,653            213,375         152,240            42,654             877,725            
2010 359,313               179,731            191,109         186,964            40,789             770,942            
2011 428,518               213,641            230,311         199,854            41,039             913,509              93 
 
 
Table 5. Equity Ratios (non-risk weighted), by Bank Type,  Mexico, 1997-2011 
   All Banks  Domestic  DeNovo  Foreign MA 
1997  9%  9%  10%  4% 
1998  9%  9%  10%  7% 
1999  10%  10%  10%  8% 
2000  10%  13%  21%  7% 
2001  10%  12%  10%  8% 
2002  11%  13%  10%  10% 
2003  11%  12%  11%  11% 
2004  11%  13%  11%  10% 
2005  12%  14%  12%  12% 
2006  13%  14%  10%  13% 
2007  13%  13%  10%  14% 
2008  10%  9%  10%  10% 
2009  11%  10%  15%  11% 
2010  11%  10%  9%  11% 
2011  10%  10%  15%  11% 
Source: Calculated by the authors from Mexico. CNBV. Boletin Estadistico de Banca Multiple, available on-line 
at www.cnbv.org, accessed April 28, 2012. 
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Table 6. Non-Performing Loan Ratio by Bank Type, 1997-2011 
   All Banks  Domestic  DeNovo  Foreign MA 
1997  11%  12%  3%  4% 
1998  10%  12%  2%  2% 
1999  8%  9%  2%  2% 
2000  6%  4%  1%  5% 
2001  4%  5%  2%  4% 
2002  5%  3%  2%  5% 
2003  3%  2%  1%  4% 
2004  3%  1%  1%  3% 
2005  2%  1%  2%  2% 
2006  2%  2%  2%  2% 
2007  3%  2%  3%  3% 
2008  3%  2%  4%  3% 
2009  3%  3%  5%  3% 
2010  3%  2%  4%  3% 
2011  2%  3%  2%  2% 
Source: Calculated by the authors from Mexico. CNBV. Boletin Estadistico de Banca Multiple , available on-
line at www.cnbv.org, accessed April 28, 2012. 
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Table 7. Returns of Banks in Mexico, 1997–2011 
   Return on assets (ROA) in %  Return on equity (ROE) in % 
   All banks  Domestic 
Foreign 
MA 
Foreign 
DeNovo  All banks  Domestic 
Foreign 
MA 
Foreign 
DeNovo 
1997  0.1  0.2  -0.3  -0.8  1.0  2.3  -3.1  -20.8 
1998  0.5  0.7  -0.1  -0.3  6.9  8.9  -0.8  -15.4 
1999  0.1  0.0  0.4  1.0  1.2  -0.4  3.6  13.7 
2000  0.9  1.7  -0.7  0.3  8.8  9.6  -1.8  11.1 
2001  1.0  0.8  0.6  1.2  10.4  6.9  7.8  15.4 
2002  0.5  1.5  -0.2  0.4  5.2  4.5  -2.1  6.7 
2003  1.4  0.7  0.8  1.6  12.7  5.8  8.9  14.5 
2004  1.2  1.2  0.2  1.3  12.0  9.6  2.5  13.0 
2005  2.2  2.0  1.3  2.3  18.7  14.2  11.5  20.3 
2006  2.5  1.7  0.8  2.8  20.1  12.4  8.3  22.8 
2007  2.1  1.5  0.6  2.3  15.9  11.3  6.1  17.6 
2008  1.2  1.0  1.1  1.3  12.2  11.9  12.3  12.4 
2009  1.3  1.1  0.5  1.6  12.9  11.5  5.6  14.7 
2010  1.3  1.3  0.3  1.5  11.8  12.6  3.6  13.0 
2011  1.2  1.2  0.3  1.5  12.3  12.0  4.5  13.9 
 Source: Calculated by the authors from  Mexico. Comision Nacional Bancaria. Banca Multiple. Diciembre 
1982-Diciembre 1993 CNB, May 1994, for 1982-1993; Mexico. Comision Nacional Bancaria y de Valores. 
Boletin Estadistico de Banca Multiple. CNBV, December 1995, for 1992-1995; and, the Boletin Estadistico de 
Banca Multiple available on-line at www.cnbv.org, accessed April 28, 2012. 
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Table 8. Banks Operating in Mexico, by Ownership Type, September 1997 to December 2011 
Domestically 
owned bank 
Dates in sample 
(year:quarter)  Foreign de novo bank
b 
Dates in sample 
(year:quarter) 
Foreign MA bank
a 
(Acquirer – Acquired bank) 
Dates in sample 
(year:quarter) 
Amigo  2007:3  2011:4  ABN AMRO/Royal Bank of Scotland  1997:3  2011:4  BBVA – Bancomer  2000:4  2011:4 
Ahorro Famsa  2007:1  2011:4  American Express  1997:4  2011:4  Citibank – Banamex  2002:4  2011:4 
Autofin  2006:4  2011:4  Ve Por Mas (former Dresdner Bank)  2004:2  2011:4  GE Capital Bank – Alianza  1997:4  2011:4 
Afirme  1997.3  2011:4  Bank of America  1997:3  2011:4  HSBC – Bital  2002:4  2011:4 
Banamex  1997:3  2002:3  Bank One  1998:1  2004:3  Santander  – Banco Mexicano  1997:4  2004:4 
BANCEN  1997:3  2006:2  BankBoston  1997:3  2004:2  Santander Mexicano – Serfin  2000:3  2011:4 
Banco Azteca  2002:4  2011:4  BNP Mexico  1997:3  2000:4  Scotiabank Inverlat – Inverlat  2000:4  2011:4 
Bancomer  1997:3  2000:3  Chase Manhattan  1997:3  2001:1       
Bancoppel  2007:3  2011:4  Citibank  1997:4  1998:3       
Banortee
c  1997:3  2011:4  Comerica/ Monex  1997:3  2011:4       
Banpaís  1998:1  1999:4  Deustche  2000:4  2001:4       
BanRegio  1997:3  2011:4  Dresdner Bank  1997:3  2003:2       
Bansí  1997:3  2011:4  HSBC  1997:3  2003:1       
Bital  1997:3  2002:3  ING Bank  1997:3  2011:4       
Compartamos  2006:2  2011:3  J. P. Morgan  1997:3  2011:4       
Del Bajío  1997:3  2011:4  BBVA/ Probursa (Acquired 1995)  1997:3  2000:3       
Fácil  2007:3  2011:4  Prudential/Actinver  2008:1  2011:4       
Inbursa  1997:3  2011:4  Nations Bank  1997:3  1998:4       
Interacciones  1997:3  2011:4  Société Générale  1997:3  1999:4       
Invex  1997:3  2011:4  Tokio Mitsubishi  1997:3  2011:4       
IXE  1997:3  2011:4             
Mifel  1997:3  2011:4             
Multiva  2007:2  2011:4             
Regional  2008:4  2011:4             
Quadrum  1997:3  2001:3             
Serfin  1997:3  2000:2             
a.  We code Mexican banks as foreign MA banks on the date that the merged bank began to operate. 
b.  For some of our econometric analysis we excluded the observations of ABN Amro/RBS, JP Morgan, and Bank of America, and Deutsche Bank because of 
the volatile way in which they reported interest income. 
c.  Banorte since December of 2008 reports its financials as Banco Mercantil del Norte. 
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Table 9. Summary Statistics of the Mexican Banking System, September 1997–December 2011 
   All Banks  Domestic Banks  Foreign M&A  Foreign De Novo 
Variable  N  mean  sd  N  mean  sd  N  mean  sd  N  mean  sd 
Assets (current P$)  1747  81602.25  177638.60  876  50198  93781  289  291684  316928  582  24552  71371 
NIM  1742  0.029  0.074  876  0.030  0.055  289  0.019  0.029  577  0.032  0.106 
ROA (%)  1747  -0.001  0.023  876  0.001  0.024  289  0.002  0.007  582  -0.005  0.027 
ROE (%)  1747  0.010  0.083  876  0.015  0.091  289  0.026  0.064  582  -0.005  0.078 
Cash/assets  1747  0.160  0.129  876  0.135  0.098  289  0.157  0.068  582  0.199  0.175 
admin costs/assets  1747  0.030  0.054  876  0.032  0.047  289  0.023  0.030  582  0.032  0.071 
NPL/Loans  1747  0.034  0.066  876  0.043  0.067  289  0.031  0.026  582  0.022  0.077 
Equity ratio  1747  0.176  0.154  876  0.172  0.154  289  0.141  0.105  582  0.199  0.169 
Housing loans/assets  1710  0.037  0.090  869  0.039  0.083  287  0.085  0.108  554  0.009  0.077 
FOBAPROA loans/assets  1184  0.060  0.144  567  0.072  0.174  217  0.109  0.140  400  0.016  0.066 
Commercial loans/assets  1710  0.307  0.237  869  0.359  0.236  287  0.236  0.168  554  0.261  0.250 
Consumer loans/assets  1710  0.090  0.204  869  0.099  0.214  287  0.088  0.116  554  0.077  0.224 
Note: We exclude observations from our analysis when banks had net interest margins above 100% or below -100%. 
 
   98 
Table 10. Net Interest Margins Regressions 
   1  2    
  NIMs  NIMs  NIMs 
VARIABLES  Random Effects  Random Effects  Fixed Effects 
Foreign MA dummy  -0.008  -0.009*  0.001 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Foreign MA * trend  -0.000     
  (0.000)     
Foreign De Novo dummy  -0.019**  -0.014**  -0.009 
  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
Foreign De Novo * trend  0.000     
  (0.000)     
Trend  0.000     
  (0.000)     
Cash over assets  -0.025  -0.029  -0.012 
  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.017) 
Admin costs over assets  0.456*  0.346  0.057 
  (0.250)  (0.254)  (0.345) 
NPL over loans  -0.064  -0.056  -0.036 
  (0.045)  (0.046)  (0.048) 
Equity Ratio  -0.038*  -0.045*  -0.084* 
  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.047) 
Housing loans over assets  0.027  0.035  -0.047 
  (0.037)  (0.035)  (0.029) 
FOBAPROA loans over assets  -0.019**  -0.020*  -0.018 
  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.034) 
Commercial loans over assets  -0.010  -0.010  -0.019 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.014) 
Consumer loans over assets  0.062**  0.064***  0.013 
  (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
Constant  0.017  0.023**  0.047** 
  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.019) 
Observations  1,035  1,039  1,039 
Number of banks  40  41  41 
R2 overall  0.41  0.35  0.13 
R2 between  0.45  0.50  0.02 
R2 within  0.13  0.09  0.16 
Chi2 (RE)/F-stat(FE)  98.63  34.26  6.927 
Chi2/F p value  0.00  0.00  0.00 
AR1-test F stat  0.03  0.28  0.28 
AR1-test pval  0.86  0.60  0.60 
Dependent variable is net interest margins (NIMs), where NIMs equal interest and commissions on loans over 
total loans minus interest and commissions paid on deposits over total deposits. . The sample goes from 
September 1997 to December 2011. All estimations include quarterly dummies. Robust Standard Errors 
clustered at the bank level. Significance of 1, 5, and 10 per cent denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 11. Nonperforming Loan Regressions 
   1  2 
  NPLs  NPLs 
  
Random 
Effects 
Bank Fixed 
Effects 
Foreign MA dummy  -0.017  -0.065*** 
  (0.014)  (0.021) 
Foreign MA * trend  -0.000   
  (0.000)   
Foreign De Novo dummy  -0.071***  -0.078*** 
  (0.020)  (0.022) 
Foreign De Novo * trend  0.002***   
  (0.000)   
Trend  -0.000*   
  (0.000)   
Cash over assets  0.075  0.064 
  (0.080)  (0.094) 
Admin costs over assets  -0.345  0.477 
  (0.388)  (0.384) 
Equity Ratio  0.123*  0.116* 
  (0.073)  (0.062) 
FOBAPROA loans over assets  0.061  0.003 
  (0.072)  (0.160) 
Housing loans over assets  0.137***  0.081* 
  (0.051)  (0.046) 
Commercial loans over assets  -0.054  -0.058 
  (0.048)  (0.046) 
Consumer loans over assets  0.032  0.030 
  (0.030)  (0.070) 
Constant  0.039  0.037 
  (0.033)  (0.056) 
     
Observations  1,035  1,039 
Number of banks  40  41 
R2 overall  0.27  0.09 
R2 between  0.21  0.00 
R2 within  0.17  0.20 
Dependent variable is nonperforming loans to total loans. . The sample goes from September 1997 to December 
2011. All estimations include quarterly dummies. Robust Standard Errors clustered at the bank level. 
Significance of 1, 5, and 10 per cent denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 12. Private Lending Regressions 
   1  2  3 
  Private credit  Private credit  Private credit 
VARIABLES 
Random effects 
with trends 
Random effects 
without trends  Fixed effects 
          
Foreign MA dummy  -0.062  -0.051*  -0.054* 
  (0.067)  (0.027)  (0.030) 
Foreign MA * trend  0.000     
  (0.001)     
Foreign De Novo dummy  0.038  0.079  0.077 
  (0.109)  (0.088)  (0.133) 
Foreign De Novo * trend  0.002     
  (0.002)     
Trend  -0.000     
  (0.000)     
Net int. margins  -0.122  -0.115  -0.123 
  (0.274)  (0.222)  (0.245) 
Cash over assets  -0.600***  -0.597***  -0.594*** 
  (0.128)  (0.125)  (0.128) 
Admin costs over assets  0.643  0.547  1.021** 
  (0.518)  (0.472)  (0.503) 
NPL over loans  -0.163  -0.153  -0.176 
  (0.116)  (0.114)  (0.114) 
Equity Ratio  0.163  0.159  0.171 
  (0.155)  (0.154)  (0.164) 
Constant  0.542***  0.470***  0.518*** 
  (0.073)  (0.060)  (0.053) 
Observations  1,035  1,039  1,039 
Number of banks  40  41  41 
R2 overall  0.15  0.21  0.21 
R2 between  0.11  0.09  0.07 
R2 within  0.23  0.23  0.23 
 
Dependent variable is total private loans to assets (private loans are the sum of commercial, consumer, and 
housing loans). The sample goes from September 1997 to December 2011. All estimations include quarterly 
dummies. Robust Standard Errors clustered at the bank level. Significance of 1, 5, and 10 per cent denoted by 
***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 